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Abstract
This dissertation contains three essays on unconventional monetary policies.
Forward guidance during the zero lower bound period is typically modeled as news that
alters the expected liftoff date of the policy rate, assuming that agents do not expect a policy
rate hike in near future. In the first chapter, I empirically reject this assumption using U.S.
high-frequency data and show that forward guidance affects the entire term structure of
expected rates. Introducing this estimated forward guidance shock in a standard New Key-
nesian model substantially magnifies the “forward guidance puzzle”. I show that allowing
agents to update their macroeconomic expectations in the pessimistic direction following
a forward guidance easing explains this larger puzzle per se, unlike the common approach
of introducing a discount parameter due to a deviation from baseline assumptions. In addi-
tion, I find that the puzzle can also be explained by sticky information general equilibrium
models.
Central bank communication could be interpreted in two ways, either as central bank’s
commitment to a future action, known as Odyssean guidance, or its forecast of future eco-
nomic conditions, known as Delphic guidance. The empirical literature has identified the
Delphic and Odyssean components of forward guidance policies. In the second chapter,
I show that another unconventional policy tool, large-scale asset purchases, can also be
empirically decomposed into Delphic and Odyssean components, and these two compo-
nents have opposing impacts on macroeconomic expectations in the US along with other
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advanced and emerging market economies. Finally, I estimate the asset price responses to
Delphic and Odyssean policies.
In the third chapter, I identify the Bank of England’s forward guidance and quantita-
tive easing surprises during the effective lower bound period in the UK. Then, I estimate
asset price responses to these unconventional policies by local projections. I show that
both surprises significantly move gilt yields and term premia on days of monetary policy
announcements. However, their impact persists for only a few months. I further document
that only forward guidance is effective in moving stock prices and their volatility. While
both surprises influence the British pound, the impact of forward guidance persists for at
least six months.
JEL Classification: E32, E43, E44, E52, E58
Keywords: Forward Guidance, Large Scale Asset Purchases, Impulse Response Matching,
DSGE models, Expectations, Delphic and Odyssean Policies, Signalling, Unconventional
Monetary Policies, High-Frequency Identification
Primary Reader: Jonathan H. Wright
Secondary Reader: Gregory R. Duffee
iii
Acknowledgement
I have benefited from the presence, support and guidance of many people during my PhD
studies.
First and foremost, I am indebted to Jonathan Wright for his exceptional guidance and
constant support. Without his mentorship, this dissertation would not be possible. I also
would like to thank Greg Duffee and Olivier Jeanne for their insightful comments and help-
ful suggestions. I have also benefited greatly from conversations with Refet Gurkaynak,
Chris Carroll, Jon Faust and Laurence Ball.
I would like to thank Philippe Andrade, Silvia Miranda-Agrippino and Ambrogio Cesa-
Bianchi for their invaluable guidance during my dissertation fellowship at the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Boston and PhD internship at the Bank of England.
I have also received immense support from colleagues. I especially would like to thank
Raul Betancourt, Lalit Contractor, Melih Firat, Prerna Rakheja, Pavel Solis and Sahan
Yildiz for making Baltimore our second home. I also would like to thank Burcu Duygan-
Bump, Burcin Kisacikoglu, Gizem Kosar and Emek Karaca for being excellent role models
and mentors.
I would like to thank my parents, Tijen Aksit and Necmi Aksit, for their continuous
support and encouragement since I was little.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my wife, Melis Atalar Aksit. Without her
unconditional love and unwavering support, this would not be possible.
iv
Dedication
To my parents, Tijen Aksit and Necmi Aksit, for always believing in me...





List of Tables xi
List of Figures xiii
1 How to Model Forward Guidance and Address a Larger Puzzle 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 A Larger Forward Guidance Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1 Modeling a Forward Guidance Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 Identification of an Empirical FG Surprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.3 Response of Interest Rate Expectations to an FG Surprise . . . . . . 10
1.2.4 Using Empirics to Model an FG Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.5 A Larger FG Puzzle to Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Bounded Rationality, Delphic Interpretation and Sticky Information . . . . 13
1.3.1 Baseline Sticky Price Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.2 Adding Bounded Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.3 Adding a Probability of Delphic Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.4 Sticky Information Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
vi
1.4 Calibration and Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.2 Local Projections: Empirical Impulse Responses . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.3 Baseline Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.4 Estimation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 Addressing the Forward Guidance Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.1 The Sticky Price Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.2 Adding Bounded Rationality in the Sticky Price Model . . . . . . . 30
1.5.3 Adding Delphic Interpretation in the Sticky Price Model . . . . . . 32
1.5.4 The Sticky Information Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2 Unconventional Monetary Policy Surprises: Delphic or Odyssean? 48
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 Delphic and Odyssean UMP Surprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2.1 Identification of FG and LSAP Surprises in the ZLB Period . . . . 54
2.2.2 Extracting the Delphic Component of a UMP . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3 Response of Expectations to Decomposed UMPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3.1 Domestic Private Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3.2 Foreign Private Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4 Response of Asset Prices to Decomposed UMPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
vii
2.4.1 Response of the Yield Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.4.2 Response of Stock Prices and the US Dollar . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.4.3 Response of Volatility Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.4.4 Response of Corporate Yields and Spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5 Robustness Check: News Announcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3 Identification of Forward Guidance and QE Surprises in the UK 86
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3 Analysis of Important Announcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.4 The Responses of Asset Prices to UMP Surprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.4.1 Response of Gilt Yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.4.2 Response of Term Premia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.4.3 Response of Stock Prices and the Exchange Rate . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4.4 Response of Corporate Spreads and Equity Risk Premia . . . . . . 101
3.5 The Persistence of the Effects on Asset Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.5.1 Persistence of the Responses of Gilt Yields and Term Premia . . . . 103
3.5.2 Persistence of the Responses of Stock Prices and the Pound . . . . 104
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
viii
A Appendix A: Standard Sticky Price Model 120
A.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.2 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B Appendix B: Adding Rigidities in the Labor Market 123
B.1 Sticky Price Model with Sticky Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.2 Sticky Information Model with Labor Market Rigidities . . . . . . . . . . . 125





1 Baseline Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2 Model Fit under Different Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3 Estimated Values of the Structural Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4 Probability of Delphic Interpretation Estimations under Different Calibrations 38
5 Interaction of UMPs with the Fed’s Different View of the Macroeconomy . 75
6 Response of Bluechip Forecasts to Decomposed UMPs . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7 Response of International Forecasts for the Following Year to Decomposed
UMPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
8 Response of the US Treasury Yields and TIPS to Decomposed UMPs . . . 78
9 Response of Stock Prices and the USD to Decomposed UMPs . . . . . . . 79
10 Response of Volatility Measures to Decomposed UMPs . . . . . . . . . . . 80
11 Response of Corporate Yields and Spreads to Decomposed UMPs . . . . . 81
12 Response of Bluechip Forecasts to Decomposed UMPs and Economic News 82
13 Testing the Number of Factors that Explain the Interest Rate Movements
Around MPC Announcements in the Pre-ELB Period . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
14 Testing the Number of Factors that Explain the Interest Rate Movements
Around MPC Announcements in the ELB Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
15 Response of Gilt Yields to FG and QE Surprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
16 Response of the Term Premia to FG and QE Surprises . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
x
17 Responses of Stock Prices and the British Pound to FG and QE . . . . . . . 110
18 Responses of Corporate Spreads and Equity Risk Premia to FG and QE . . 111
B1 Estimations under Sticky Prices and Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
xi
List of Figures
1 Modeling an FG Shock: One-Period vs Estimated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2 Survey Expectations of the 3-Month Treasury Yield at the Zero Lower Bound 40
3 Empirical FG and LSAP Surprises during the ZLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 The Response of Interest Rate Expectations to an FG Surprise . . . . . . . 42
5 Larger FG Puzzle: Baseline Sticky Price Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6 Sticky Price Model with Bounded Rationality (Cognitive Discount Factor
= 0.21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7 Sticky Price Model with Delphic Interpretation (Delphic Interpretation =
0.39) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8 Sticky Information Model (Information Update Frequency of Consumers
= 0.04) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9 Test of Model Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10 Empirical FG and LSAP Surprises during the ZLB Period . . . . . . . . . . 83
11 Decomposed LSAP Surprises during the ZLB Period . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
12 Decomposed FG Surprises during the ZLB Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
13 FG and QE Surprises in the UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
14 Responses of Gilt Yields and Term Premia to FG Surprises . . . . . . . . . 113
15 Responses of Gilt Yields and Term Premia to QE Surprises . . . . . . . . . 114
16 Persistence of the Effect of FG on Gilt Yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
xii
17 Persistence of the Effect of QE on Gilt Yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
18 Persistence of the Effect of FG on the Term Premia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
19 Persistence of the Effect of QE on the Term Premia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
20 The Effect of FG and QE on Stock Prices, Market Volatility and the Pound . 119
B1 Baseline Sticky Price Model with Sticky Wages (Inverse Wage Stickiness
= 0.25) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
xiii
Chapter 1
1 How to Model Forward Guidance and Address a Larger
Puzzle
1.1 Introduction
At the August 2011 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcement, the Federal
Reserve (Fed) communicated that it expects “exceptionally low levels for the federal funds
rate at least through mid-2013”. The Eurodollar futures rates immediately reacted, imply-
ing a 29 basis point drop in the expected 3-month rate as of June 2013. Standard New
Keynesian (NK) models imply that rational agents raise their inflation expectations today
following a decline in the expected future path of the policy rate. As the expected real rates
drop, both consumption and production increase immediately.
Del Negro et al. (2015) show that the empirical response of output and inflation expec-
tations to forward guidance (FG) announcements is much smaller than the one predicted by
the standard NK models. They label this discrepancy the “forward guidance puzzle”. An
FG shock that lowers the expected 8-quarter-ahead nominal short rate by 25 basis points
could raise production and inflation on impact by more than a few percentage points in
these models. Empirically, the impact is much smaller and is not instantaneous. A growing
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literature attempts to understand in what ways these NK models are misspecified.
In this paper, I make two contributions to this line of literature. First, I show that
much of the existing literature understates the magnitude of the misspecification. The usual
method of modeling an FG shock is as an innovation in the 8-quarter-ahead nominal short
rate. Hence, FG is widely modeled as a one-period extension to a zero lower bound (ZLB)
period, the duration of which was already known by all agents. I document that, em-
pirically, an FG shock that lowers the 8-quarter-ahead nominal short rate also lowers the
expected short rates at all preceding quarterly horizons in the US during the ZLB period.
The cumulative macroeconomic effects of these lower expected short rates are, in stan-
dard NK models, about two times larger (in terms of the instantaneous responses) than the
macroeconomic effects produced by the usual FG modeling approach. Second, I evaluate
which modifications to NK models are able to fit the empirical responses of macroeco-
nomic variables to FG by running a “horse-race” among the best performing models from
three different classes of models.
The common approach within this line of literature is to introduce a discount mecha-
nism that governs the deviation from a baseline assumption. This mechanism is often sum-
marized by a discount parameter in the NK Phillips curve and the dynamic IS curve that
dampens the excessive response of an NK model. For example, Gabaix (2020) introduces
a discount parameter due to bounded rationality, which is defined as the underestimation of
the future deviations of macroeconomic variables from their steady states. I show that the
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degree of bounded rationality required to explain the FG puzzle is implausibly large. Since
the bounded rationality framework of Gabaix (2020) is the best performing discount mech-
anism (in terms of its ability to dampen the excessive response implied by a standard NK
model) among the most cited discount mechanisms proposed within this class of models, I
argue that the approach of introducing a particular discount mechanism is not able to fully
explain the FG puzzle.
An alternative modification to a standard NK model is to relax the standard assumption
that FG only alters the future interest rate expectations without revealing any information
about the state of the economy. Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) and Andrade et al. (2019)
introduce a framework in which information about the state of the economy is revealed to
agents through FG or agents infer the macroeconomic forecasts of the central bank through
FG. This approach is motivated from the empirical finding that macroeconomic expecta-
tions could be adjusted in either direction depending on the magnitude of the two oppos-
ing implications of FG. In particular, an FG communication could either be interpreted as
the central bank’s commitment to a future action or its forecast of future macroeconomic
conditions. I call the former channel Odyssean and the latter channel Delphic following
Campbell et al. (2012). Motivated by this line of literature, I propose a framework in which
agents infer what they think the central bank’s macroeconomic expectations are1 and show
that a plausible probability of Delphic interpretation suffices to fully explain the FG puzzle.
1The standard assumption is that agents correctly interpret the announced interest rate path as Odyssean.
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Another branch of the literature proposes to replace the sticky price assumption of the
standard NK models with sticky information. In particular, Chung et al. (2014), Carlstrom
et al. (2015), Kiley (2016) replace the NK Phillips Curve with the less forward-looking
sticky information Phillips curve to explain, at least in part, the FG puzzle. In this paper, I
show that the alternative approach of using a sticky information general equilibrium model
could also be sufficient to fully explain the puzzle implied by an estimated FG shock.
Related Literature This paper is linked to a number of different lines of literature.
Shortly after the Fed communications gained more importance with the ZLB, Laséen and
Svensson (2011) helped establish a standard for introducing an FG shock in an NK model.
They show that FG can be captured as future monetary policy shocks, i.e. shocks with
non-zero time varying means, in a NK model. The most common way of introducing an
FG shock is through a one-period drop in the policy rate in N quarters (e.g. Del Negro et al.
(2015), Gabaix (2020), Chung et al. (2014), Gali (2018), McKay et al. (2016), Bundick and
Smith (2020), Farhi and Werning (2019)). This approach assumes that the duration of the
ZLB period is known with certainty by all agents before the announcement and forward
guidance is a one-period extension to the ZLB period. I call this a “one-period FG shock”
and show that it is not empirically plausible for the ZLB period in the US.2
Starting with Del Negro et al. (2015), a newly emerging line of literature proposes pos-
sible ways to address the FG puzzle. The common approach is to discount the NK Phillips
2The only two papers that use an FG shock which moves the entire term structure of interest rates that I
am aware of are Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) and Campbell et al. (2019).
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Curve (NKPC) and the dynamic IS curve in a standard NK model. Del Negro et al. (2015)
propose introducing probability of dying through a perpetual youth framework as in Blan-
chard (1985) as a way of solving the FG puzzle. Alternatively, Gabaix (2020) introduces
a discount parameter due to cognitive myopia. In this formulation, agents with cognitive
myopia have bounded rationality (BR) and underestimate the deviations from a balanced
growth path. McKay et al. (2016) introduce uninsurable income shocks and borrowing
constraints in order to discount the response of consumption through precautionary sav-
ings. Angeletos and Lian (2018) remove common knowledge of relevant news to introduce
higher order uncertainty.3
A smaller strand of literature is motivated by the opposing implications of FG on
macroeconomic expectations (see e.g. Campbell et al. (2017)) and introduces a mecha-
nism through which FG conveys information about the state of the economy.4 Nakamura
and Steinsson (2018) incorporate the information conveyed about the macroeconomic fun-
damentals as a change in the trajectory of the natural rate of interest proportional to that of
the future policy rate. Therefore, the central bank not only impacts the path of the policy
rate but also the path of the real interest rate that would prevail absent pricing frictions.5
3Other examples include: Hagedorn et al. (2019) who employ incomplete markets, Campbell et al. (2017)
who introduce preferences for government bonds, Kaplan et al. (2018) who use ex-post heterogenous agents,
Campbell and Weber (2018) who introduce imperfect credibility, and Farhi and Werning (2019) who employ
BR and incomplete markets simultaneously.
4Bauer and Swanson (2020) recently proposed an argument which attributes these opposing implications
to not controlling for macroeconomic news announcements. The second chapter of this dissertation shows
that the Delphic components of FG and LSAP surprises remain very significant after controlling for macroe-
conomic news announcements.
5Although the authors do not discuss the implications for addressing the FG puzzle, I find that an implau-
sibly large Delphic component (98%) is required to explain the larger FG puzzle.
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In similar work, Andrade et al. (2019) model a negative structural shock which drags the
economy into a liquidity trap in the spirit of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). They model
“date-based” FG as a commitment to stay at the ZLB for longer than the duration implied
by the negative structural shock, in the presence of Delphic agents who believe there will
be no additional accommodation at the end of the ZLB period. Hence, the nature of the FG
experiment in their paper is different from the one proposed in this paper.6
A parallel line of literature proposes to employ sticky information models with inatten-
tive firms as in Mankiw and Reis (2002) to mitigate the puzzle (see e.g. Chung et al. (2014),
Carlstrom et al. (2015), Kiley (2016)). These models replace the forward-looking Phillips
curve used in sticky price models. Since firms choose to update their information sets spo-
radically, the price level is mostly determined by the past expectations of today’s optimal
price rather than today’s expectations of future optimal prices. Hence, news about the fu-
ture has much milder effects.7 I show that a sticky information model, in which consumers
are also inattentive, can also explain the puzzle implied by an estimated FG shock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 estimates an FG shock for
the first ZLB period in the US and shows that using this estimated FG shock substantially
magnifies the FG puzzle. Section 3 presents a baseline sticky price model, a BR framework,
6They assess the implications of committing to stay at the ZLB through “date-based” FG following a
structural shock as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) instead of introducing FG as a future policy shock in
the spirit of Laséen and Svensson (2011).
7Eggertsson and Garga (2019) highlight that sticky information models imply a smaller initial response
than sticky price models in the presence of FG shocks. They further show that the sticky information frame-
work does not perform better than the sticky price framework when a structural shock moves the policy rate
to the ZLB.
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a Delphic interpretation framework and a sticky information general equilibrium model.
Section 4 describes the data and explains the estimation methodology. Section 5 discusses
how well the described models can explain the larger FG puzzle. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 A Larger Forward Guidance Puzzle
1.2.1 Modeling a Forward Guidance Shock
An FG shock is an information shock about the future path of the policy rate. Thus, it is
categorically different from a conventional monetary policy shock. While a conventional
shock conveys information about the policy rate at t = 0, an FG shock conveys information
about the next N periods. Due to the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of
interest rates, a surprise that changes the interest rate expectations of the next N periods is
equivalent to a sequence of future monetary policy shocks for the next N periods, assuming
there is no change in term premia.
The red line in Figure 1 shows a widely used FG shock in the FG puzzle literature.
Note that the interest rate expectations do not change for the next N − 1 periods. This is
due to the implicit assumption that market participants’ ex-ante interest rate expectations
for the next N − 1 periods were 0. Hence, FG is captured as a one-period extension to a
ZLB period, the length of which was common knowledge before the announcement.8
8Note that this “date-based” FG modeling is a practical but not realistic exercise in which the central bank
announces the exact liftoff date. In the US, the Fed communicated the minimum expected length of the ZLB
period in only three announcements: August 2011, January 2012 and September 2012.
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Contrary to this simplifying assumption, the survey expectations of the short rates dur-
ing the ZLB period in the US, as depicted in Figure 2, indicates that market participants did
not expect the ZLB period to last very long. Using intraday futures data, I test the empir-
ical plausibility of this simplifying assumption by estimating the high-frequency response
of interest rate expectations for the next N−1 periods to an FG surprise that moves the Nth
period expectations in the US during the ZLB period.
In order to test this, one needs to set a horizon over which the Fed’s FG policies shape
the interest rate expectations during the ZLB period. I set N = 8 due to the widely accepted
argument that Fed’s FG policy operates through a roughly two-year horizon during the ZLB
period9 (e.g. Swanson and Williams (2014), Hanson and Stein (2015), Gertler and Karadi
(2015)). Clearly, one also needs to identify an empirical FG surprise.
1.2.2 Identification of an Empirical FG Surprise
I identify the FG and LSAP surprises following a similar methodology as in Rogers et al.
(2018). I characterize the 120-minute changes (from 15 minutes before the announcement
to 1 hour and 45 minutes after the announcement) in the 8th Eurodollar futures rates, i.e.
the market expectations of what the short rates in the US is going to be roughly in two
years, as the FG surprise.10 I assume that term premia do not change over this small in-
9One could argue for a higher horizon for the ZLB period (e.g. Campbell et al. (2019) uses N=10). Setting
N > 8 makes the conclusions of this paper stronger.
10The choice of Eurodollar futures to capture the interest rate expectations is due to the liquidity of these
assets. Their high-frequency response to FOMC announcements within a 120-minute window is highly
volatile. One might argue that the interest rate expectations in the US are better captured by the OIS rates.
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terval following the literature11 (e.g. Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005), Evans and Marshall (1998)).
As noted by Swanson (2020), this surprise is very highly correlated with the FG factor
obtained through rotating the first two principle components of asset price movements as in
Gürkaynak et al. (2005). Note that the Fed funds futures rate, i.e. the market expectations
of what the Fed funds rate will be at the end of the current or next month, and its surprises
were practically zero during the ZLB period.
The asset price movements around FOMC announcements at the ZLB period can be
explained by the two principal components of the changes in interest rate expectations
at different horizons as shown in Swanson (2020). These principal components can be
rotated to have the structural interpretation of FG and LSAP surprises. Following Rogers
et al. (2018), I identify LSAP surprises by regressing the 120-minute change in the 10-
year Treasury yields around FOMC announcements on the FG surprise. I characterize the
residuals of this regression as the LSAP surprise. Thus, the high-frequency response of the
high end of the yield curve is explained by the combination of FG and LSAP surprises by
construction. Figure 3 shows the identified empirical FG and LSAP surprises during the
ZLB period.
However, the OIS futures are less volatile. In order to control for the difference between the interest rate
implied by Eurodollar futures (the LIBOR rate) and the OIS rate, I check the daily response of the LIBOR-
OIS spread to an FG surprise and find no economic significance. The spread moves a basis point in response
to an FG surprise that moves the 8-quarter-ahead interest rate expectations by 25 basis points.
11I also find that the term premium component of the two year rates do not significantly move at the daily
frequency around FOMC announcements during the ZLB period.
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1.2.3 Response of Interest Rate Expectations to an FG Surprise
I test whether the interest rate expectations of the next 7 quarters respond significantly to an
FG surprise. Equation (1) shows the regression employed to measure the high-frequency
response of the first 8 Eurodollar futures rates to an FG surprise which moves the 2-year








where ∆ED is the 120-minute change in the ith Eurodollar futures rate, i ∈ {1,2, ..,8},
around each FOMC meeting. FG is the FG surprise. t ∈ T where T=55, the number of
FOMC announcements during the ZLB period. I plot the results of this regression (after
normalizing for an easing FG surprise) for i ∈ {1,2, ..,8} in Figure 4. The estimated coef-
ficients are the percentage point (pp) changes in the interest rate expectations in response
to an FG surprise that moves the 8-quarter-ahead interest rate expectations by 25 bps.
1.2.4 Using Empirics to Model an FG Shock
Figure 4 shows that the high-frequency movement of the first 7 Eurodollar futures rates
in response to an FG surprise that moves the 8th Eurodollar futures rate by 25 bps around
FOMC announcements during the ZLB are all statistically significant. When the Fed an-
nounces that interest rates will remain at the ZLB for longer than market participants had
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expected, interest rate expectations of the horizons the Fed referred to move closer to 0
after the announcement. Thus, Figure 4 implies that on average the market participants had
an ex-ante expectation of a strictly positive future interest rate path at any quarterly horizon
during the ZLB period.12
The black line in Figure 1 captures this collapse in the interest rate expectations in
response to an FG shock that lowers the 8-quarter-ahead interest rate expectations by 25
bps. I call this black line an “estimated FG shock” and the red line a “one-period FG
shock”. An estimated FG shock that lowers 8-quarter-ahead interest rate expectations by
25 bps is equivalent in magnitude (in terms of the implied impulse responses at time 0) to a
one-period FG shock that lowers the 8-quarter-ahead interest rate expectations by about 60
bps. Hence, the estimated FG shock is about two times more powerful than the one-period
FG shock. The reason why it is not four times more powerful (note that the cumulative
interest rate cut in the estimated FG shock is about four times larger than the one in the
one-period FG shock) is that the near future policy shocks are less powerful in standard
NK models.
Note that the size of the FG shock in this policy exercise is plausible for the ZLB period.
The blue line in Figure 3 depicts the pp change in the 2-year interest rate expectations. The
March 2009 announcement, which initiated QE1, communicated that the FOMC expects to
12This result holds for different sub-samples of the ZLB period. It is also consistent with the survey
evidence in which investors expected the liftoff from the ZLB to be roughly in 2 quarters before 2012 and
increased their expectations by a few quarters afterwards.
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keep the Fed funds rate between 0 and 25 bps for “an extended period”. This decreased the
2-year interest rate expectations by 21 bps. Similarly, the August 2011 announcement of the
FOMC, which communicated that the FOMC expects to keep the Fed funds rate between
0 and 25 bps “at least through mid-2013”, lowered the 2-year interest rate expectations by
29 bps.
1.2.5 A Larger FG Puzzle to Address
The implication of this empirical finding is crucial for structural modeling since addressing
the FG puzzle gets more difficult in the presence of a sequence of future policy shocks
rather than a single future policy shock. Since the estimated FG shock is about two times
more powerful in a standard NK model, the FG puzzle is much more difficult to address.
Hence, a natural question to ask is whether the proposed solutions in the FG puzzle litera-
ture are able to address the puzzle implied by an estimated FG shock. In order to address
this question, I run a “horse-race” among three models from different branches of the litera-
ture: i) introducing a discount mechanism in a sticky price model, ii) allowing FG to reveal
information about the state of the economy in a sticky price model and iii) switching to
sticky information as the main source of nominal rigidity. I use the best performing model
for addressing the FG puzzle in each branch: i) a sticky price model with BR as proposed
by Gabaix (2020), ii) a sticky price model with Delphic interpretation as proposed in this
paper and iii) a sticky information general equilibrium model as in Reis (2009).
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1.3 Bounded Rationality, Delphic Interpretation and Sticky Informa-
tion
First, I describe a standard sticky price model in which the FG puzzle emerges. Then, I
present the BR framework proposed by Gabaix (2020) to address the FG puzzle in a sticky
price model. Next, I propose an alternative framework which is motivated by the opposing
implications of FG (i.e. it could either be interpreted as Delphic or Odyssean) and could
easily be introduced in a sticky price model to address the FG puzzle. Finally, I describe a
standard sticky information model with inattentive consumers and firms.
1.3.1 Baseline Sticky Price Model
The baseline model is a canonical three-equation standard sticky price model as in Gali
(2008). The full description of the model is presented in Appendix A. This section dis-
plays the equilibrium conditions of the baseline sticky price model in which the FG puzzle
emerges.
The standard dynamic IS curve of the baseline model is given below.
yt = Et [yt+1]−
1
σ
(it −Et [πt+1]) (2)
where yt , πt and it denote the output gap, inflation and the nominal interest rate respectively.
All are measured as deviations from the zero inflation steady state. σ is the CRRA. The
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standard NKPC is presented as:
πt = β Et [πt+1]+κyt (3)
where κ ≡ θp(1−θp)(1− (1− θp)β )(σ +ϕ). ϕ is the inverse elasticity of labor supply to
wages and θp is the inverse price stickiness parameter, i.e. θp fraction of the firms update
their prices each t.
I define a Taylor rule to close the model. The interest rate responds to both inflation and
the output gap. It has a standard policy shock term along with a future policy shock term.







where εak,t−k is a future policy shock announced at time t −k but affects the policy rule in k
periods. The FG shock announced at time t −K conveys information about the path of the
policy rate in the next K periods. εt is a standard policy shock used to cancel out the Taylor
rule implied response for the periods that the FG shock conveys information about, i.e. for
K periods. Hence, the nominal interest rate follows the announced path (e.g. the black line
in Figure 1) for K periods and follows the Taylor rule afterwards.
Equations (2)-(4) with relevant initial conditions define the sticky price equilibrium.
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1.3.2 Adding Bounded Rationality
I employ the BR framework proposed by Gabaix (2020) as it is the best performing dis-
count mechanism for addressing the FG puzzle among the most cited papers within this
line of literature. Other most cited papers that introduce a single discount mechanism are
Del Negro et al. (2015), McKay et al. (2017) and Angeletos and Lian (2018). While the
approach of Del Negro et al. (2015) is criticized by McKay et al. (2017) for requiring im-
plausibly large dying probabilities to match the data, the method of McKay et al. (2017)
only discounts the dynamic IS curve and uses a standard NK Phillips curve. Although the
lack of common knowledge as in Angeletos and Lian (2018) discounts both the Phillips
curve and the IS curve, the cognitive discount factor introduced by Gabaix (2020) is more
powerful in terms of the induced change in impulse responses per a unit change in the
discount parameter.13
More intuitively, the future expectations formed by agents and firms in response to
an FG shock could, in principal, suffer from cognitive myopia. This could be tested by
matching the empirical impulse responses of macroeconomic variables by choosing the
degree of BR, i.e. the cognitive discount factor, of households and firms.14
I define boundedly rational households and firms by introducing a single cognitive dis-
count factor, µ < 1, to represent BR while forming their future expectations as in Gabaix
13Note that the level-k thinking BR as in Farhi and Werning (2019) is also weaker than the BR introduced
in Gabaix (2020), even when it is complemented with incomplete markets for k > 1.
14Section 4.4 explains the estimation methodology in detail.
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(2020). The relationship between the BR expectations operator and the rational expecta-
tions (RE) operator is as follows:
EBRt [xt+k] = µkEt [xt+k] (5)
where k ≥ 0 and for any time varying xt . Under RE µ = 1 while µ < 1 under BR. Note
that agents have RE for the steady state variables. BR is with respect to agents’ perception
of deviations from the steady state.
Given the BR framework, the discounted dynamic IS curve can be derived as:
yt = µ Et [yt+1]−
1
σ
(it −Et [πt+1]) (6)
Notice that this formulation proposed by Gabaix (2020) assumes that boundedly rational
agents can correctly perceive the real interest rate (hence the expected inflation of the next
period). Thus, the rational Fisher equation holds in the agent’s perception of the world.15
The NKPC under BR can be derived as proposed by Gabaix (2020):
πt = β µ
f Et [πt+1]+κyt (7)






. Notice that the coefficient on future infla-
15Note that the alternative assumption of discounting Et [πt+1] does not change the conclusion of this paper.
The implied cognitive discount factor, µ , increases by around 10 bps in this alternative specification.
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tion depends on price stickiness unlike the standard model. Under BR, inflation is more
forward-looking when prices are stickier.
Equations (4), (6) and (7) with relevant initial conditions define the equilibrium for the
sticky price model with BR.
1.3.3 Adding a Probability of Delphic Interpretation
In this section, I introduce a novel framework as an alternative to the proposed discount
frameworks (e.g. introducing BR) to address the FG puzzle. Instead of deviating from
standard assumptions (e.g. full information, rational expectations, complete markets), the
proposed framework introduces an alternative interpretation of FG communication.
Campbell et al. (2012) coined the terms Delphic and Odyssean FG in reference to
Homer’s epic, Odyssey. Delphic FG refers to the component of a policy announcement
in which the public learns about the future expectations of the central bank regarding the
macroeconomic outlook whereas Odyssean FG is the commitment of the central bank to a
particular path for the policy rate, independent of the future macroeconomic conditions.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) document that growth expectations in the US are ad-
justed upwards in response to a monetary policy tightening and downwards following a
policy easing.16 As the conventional impact of monetary policy surprises on growth is in
the opposite direction, Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) argue for the existence of an alter-
16Campbell et al. (2017) show the same result for unemployment expectations.
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native channel through which monetary policy impacts the economy. They call this the Fed
information effect, i.e. the information revealed by the Fed through its policy announce-
ments. As the revealed information is about the state of the economy, the Fed information
effect can be referred to as the Delphic FG channel.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) propose to capture the macroeconomic information
content of monetary policy announcements by assuming that the change in the announced
path of the policy rate linearly impacts the future path of the natural rate of interest. I
estimate their model by choosing the parameter that governs the extent to which monetary
policy announcements have information effects versus traditional effects and find it as 0.98.
Hence, the policy announcement should be almost fully Delphic (or interpreted as almost
fully Delphic) to match the data. Since this is an implausible result for the US, I propose
an alternative way of introducing a Delphic FG channel in a standard NK model, in which
an FG easing lowers private agents’ expectations of the future path of macroeconomic
variables. Then, I show that this framework is able to match the data with empirically
plausible structural parameters.
Defining Delphic Interpretation
Equation (4) defines FG as an exogenous shock to the nominal interest rate path in the
absence of a Taylor rule for K periods, i.e. as Odyssean FG. The baseline model assumes
that all agents understand that the FG shock is Odyssean, i.e. the announced change in
the nominal interest rate path is due to an exogenous shock. I relax this empirically ques-
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tionable assumption by allowing for uncertainty about the nature of the FG shock. Agents
allocate a probability, ψ , to an announced interest rate path being an endogenous response
to a change in the central bank’s expectations of the future paths of output and inflation
(Delphic FG). With probability 1−ψ , agents believe that the announced interest rate path
is exogenous (Odyssean FG). Formally, I define Delphic interpretation as follows:
Delphic Interpretation. Delphic interpretation is the attribution of the announced inter-
est rate path, ∑Kk=1 ε
a
k,t−k, to the central bank’s reaction function, φππt + φyyt . Given the




k,t−k = φyEd,t [yt+k]+φπ Ed,t [πt+k] k ∈ 1,2, ...,K (8)
Hence, the announced interest rate path is an expectation shock as well as a monetary
policy shock under Delphic interpretation.














jEd,t [yt+k+ j] (9)
Notice that the FG shock specified in Equation (4) is Odyssean. Hence, the Delphic
interpretation of the announced interest rate path is, in fact, a false interpretation. As dis-
cussed in Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), the presence of a Delphic channel through which
output expectations are adjusted in the opposite direction is consistent with the US data. By
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introducing a Delphic channel aside from the conventional monetary policy transmission
channel, the framework proposed in this section would be able to address the FG puzzle.
A NK Model with Delphic Interpretation
Given the implied decrease in the future path of yt following an FG easing under Delphic
interpretation, I assume that households decrease their consumption paths by the inferred
decrease in the expected output path. Hence, the expected lower path of yt as expressed in
Equation (9) is introduced as a negative shock to the dynamic IS curve and is scaled by the
probability of Delphic interpretation, ψ , as follows:






















Note that with probability ψ ∈ [0,1], agents interpret an announced interest rate path as
Delphic. When there is no Delphic interpretation (ψ = 0), Equation (10) reduces to the
standard dynamic IS curve as there is no macroeconomic information content of the FG
shock. In the presence of Delphic interpretation (ψ > 0), there are two opposing channels.
The conventional channel implies a higher output path in response to an FG easing while the
Delphic interpretation lowers the output path by the inferred decrease in the expectations
of the future path of output, as described in Equation (9).
I assume that the central bank is not strategically reacting to a possible Delphic inter-
pretation of the FG shock.17 For simplicity, I assume that all agents are risk neutral. Thus,
17Otherwise, for a large ψ , the central bank might strategically bias its FG. However, agents might learn
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agents are not prone to any costs regarding the uncertainty associated with the nature of
the FG shock. The optimal pricing behavior does not change since the sensitivity of prices
to the real marginal cost is the same. Thus, the NKPC, as given in Equation (3), holds
in equilibrium. Note that the NKPC relationship implies a lower future path for inflation
given a decrease in the expected future path of output.
Equations (3), (4) and (10) with relevant initial conditions define the equilibrium for
the sticky price model with a probability of Delphic interpretation.
1.3.4 Sticky Information Model
An alternative approach proposed in the FG puzzle literature is to employ a sticky informa-
tion model. This section describes a general equilibrium model as presented in Reis (2009)
and, Khan and Zhu (2002). There is no nominal rigidity in this model since prices are not
sticky. Instead, there is information stickiness. Since information is costly to obtain, absorb
and process each period, agents optimally choose not to update their information set every
period. The main difference between the two models is the timing of the expectations in key
equations. While the previous model is built on today’s expectations of future variables,
this model operates through the past and current expectations of today’s variables.
Households
In a sticky information model, consumers optimally choose to update their information
how to interpret announcements and adjust for the bias as pointed out by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018).
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set sporadically since there is a fixed cost of acquiring information (Reis, 2006). Only δ
fraction of consumers update their information every period. I do not distinguish a unit
of household into a consumer and a worker who update their information sets at different
paces. In Appendix B, I introduce this distinction in order to show that the sticky infor-
mation model can still explain the puzzle in the presence of information stickiness in the
labor market. Appendix B further shows that introducing wage stickiness in the sticky price
model, with or without BR, does not suffice to match the empirical impulse responses.
For the δ fraction of the consumers who update their information set at a given period,
the optimal intertemporal consumption path follows the standard Euler equation:
ct,0 = Et [ct+1,0]−
1
σ
(it −Et [πt+1]) (11)
For the remaining consumers, the consumption at time t is what they thought the optimal
consumption would be last time they updated their information set (j periods ago):
ct, j = Et− j[ct,0] (12)





(1−δ ) jEt− j[ct,0]. (13)
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Firms
Unlike the Calvo price setting, all firms can update their prices every period. However,
some firms optimally choose not to update their information sets every period. Firms update
their information at the rate of θp, the same as the inverse price stickiness parameter in the
previous model. For a firm that last updated its information set i periods ago, the price
that it chooses at time t is what the firm thought the optimal price would be at time t. The
optimal price can be expressed as in Khan and Zhu (2002):
p∗t = pt +Ωyt (14)
where Ω = σ+ϕ1+ϕε .
Equilibrium






(1−θp)iEt−i [pt +Ωyt ] (15)








(1−θp)iEt−i−1 [πt +Ω∆yt ] (16)
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(it+τ − (pt+1+τ − pt+τ))
]
(17)
where y∞ = limτ→∞Et(yt+τ) is the long-run equilibrium output.
Equations (4), (15) and (17) together with relevant initial conditions define the sticky
information equilibrium.
1.4 Calibration and Estimation
The metric used for the “horse-race” among the described models is impulse response
matching. For each model, I choose the particular structural parameter of the given speci-
fication (i.e. cognitive discount factor, probability of Delphic interpretation or the informa-
tion update frequency of households) that best matches the empirical impulse responses of
macroeconomic variables to an FG surprise. I use local projections to obtain the empirical
impulse responses as in Jordà (2005).18
I describe the data in Section 4.1, the local projections estimation in Section 4.2, the
baseline calibration in Section 4.3 and the estimation methodology in Section 4.4.
18Matching covariances or structural VAR impulse responses are common methods in this line of liter-
ature. While the former approach does not allow for structural interpretations, the latter is constrained by
the invertibility of the VAR and is sensitive to the model specification. As discussed in Stock and Watson
(2018), the invertibility assumption, i.e. the assumption that structural shocks can be recovered from current
and lagged values of the data, is non-trivial and a structural VAR is not consistent without this assumption.
Although the local projections approach is not as efficient as a structural VAR with external instruments, it
does not depend on the invertibility assumption and is consistent, assuming that the empirical FG surprise is
correctly identified using intraday data under the efficient market hypothesis prior.
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1.4.1 Data
My dataset spans the first ZLB period in the US, which is from January 2009 to October
2015. In order to estimate the empirical impulse responses of the key macroeconomic vari-
ables in the US, I use log monthly CPI level and log monthly industrial production data.19
As for the number of hours worked, I use the log average weekly hours of production and
nonsupervisory employees. To capture the impact of an FG surprise on the interest rate
expectations in the US, I use the high-frequency response of the first 8 Eurodollar futures
rates, which spans roughly the interest rate expectations in the US for the next two years.
1.4.2 Local Projections: Empirical Impulse Responses
The empirical responses of macroeconomic variables to an FG surprise are obtained through
local projections as in Jordà (2005):











where ∆Mt+h is the change (Mt+h −Mt−1) of the macroeconomic variables following an
FOMC announcement at different horizons h ∈ {0,1, ...,8}. FGt and LSAPt surprises are
identified as described in Section 2.2. ∆Mmt−i, i ∈ {1,2,3}, which is the collection of pre-
ceding monthly changes of the dependent variable in the three months before the announce-
ment, is the set of control variables. The purpose of these control variables is to decrease
19I use the manufacturing industrial production index which excludes mining, and electric and gas utilities.
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the sampling variance of the estimator by decreasing the variance of the error term. The co-
efficient estimates are still consistent in the absence of these control variables since the FG
surprise, which is identified using high-frequency data, should be independent of true past
and future monetary policy shocks. Since the model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency,
the local projections are conducted quarterly (starting from the instantaneous impact up to
a two-year horizon).
I use β hFG in order to construct the empirical responses of macroeconomic variables at
different horizons. For h= 0, I use monthly responses. I use Newey-West standard errors in
order to control for autocorrelation. The maximum lag allowed in each horizon is 1.5×h.
I employ the empirical impulse responses of three macroeconomic variables: output,
inflation and hours worked. While the responses of output and inflation are commonly
studied in the FG puzzle literature, the responses of working hours is also studied (e.g.
Campbell et al. (2019)) as a significant indicator of the real sector response to an FG sur-
prise. The employed models also have substantive implications for the number of hours
worked. The impulse responses obtained by the industrial production data is the empir-
ical counterpart of yt . The CPI level, and the average weekly hours of production and
nonsupervisory employees correspond to pt and nt , respectively.
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1.4.3 Baseline Calibration
Table 1 shows the baseline calibration of the model. The model is calibrated at a quarterly
frequency. The discount factor β is standard and implies a discount rate of 1% per quarter.
The CRRA parameter σ is 1, implying log utility. Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ is
calibrated to 1, following Gali (2008). Under baseline calibration, production function is
constant returns to scale and cognitive discount factor µ is 1, implying RE. The coefficients
of inflation and output in the Taylor rule, φπ and φy, are standard in the literature following
Taylor (1999). Intratemporal elasticity among goods implies a steady state markup of 20%.
The fraction of firms which update their information set (prices) in the sticky information
model (sticky price model) is calibrated to 0.25, implying an average duration of one year
for the price level. In the sticky information model, the rate at which consumers update their
information set under the baseline calibration is 0.08, a value estimated by Reis (2009). All
results presented in Section 5 are robust to this empirically plausible baseline calibration of
structural parameters.
1.4.4 Estimation Methodology
I estimate a given model by choosing the structural parameters of interest (the cognitive
discount factor µ , the Delphic interpretation probability ψ , or the information update fre-
quency of consumers δ ) that minimize the quadratic distance between the model-implied
impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to an FG shock and their empirical coun-
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terparts which are obtained through local projections. The minimized quadratic function




(Φdata −Φmodel(θ))′V−1(Φdata −Φmodel(θ)) (19)
where Φdata is the vector of empirical impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to
an FG surprise over different horizons and Φmodel(θ) is the model-implied impulse re-
sponses of these variables given the vector θ , which includes the structural parameters to
be estimated, µ , ψ or δ . All of these variables are defined over [0, 1]. V is the variance-
covariance matrix of the empirical impulse responses, Φdata. The covariances are across
horizons and macroeconomic variables. Empirical confidence intervals (CIs) are formed
using these standard errors while the model-implied CIs employ GMM standard errors for
an over-identified case: k ≥ p. The estimated structural parameters θ̂ are asymptotically





where T is the sample size and D = ∂Φmodel(θ)
∂θ
. Using the delta method, one can obtain the




where the length of Φmodel(θ) is the estimation horizon times macroeconomic variables.
I use the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix to construct CIs for the model-implied
impulse response functions.
1.5 Addressing the Forward Guidance Puzzle
1.5.1 The Sticky Price Model
First, I illustrate the FG puzzle as the mismatch between the empirical and model-implied
impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to a one-period FG shock under the baseline
sticky price model. Figure 5 shows the drastic responses of output, price level and working
hours to a one-period FG shock, which moves the 8-quarter-ahead interest rate expectations
by 25 bps (the red shock), under the baseline sticky price model described in Section 3.1.20
The corresponding χ2 test statistic, which is the value of the objective function given in
equation (19), is reported in Table 2.21 Clearly, the empirical and model-implied impulse
20Note that the model-implied impulse responses do not have a CI since the model is fully calibrated.
21As discussed in Section 4.2, I employ the empirical impulse responses of three macroeconomic variables
over a two year horizon. These test statistics are estimated using the fit of output, the CPI level and working
hours over a two-year horizon.
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responses are significantly different from each other. Due to its forward looking nature,
the sticky price model implies large jumps in macroeconomic variables. The magnitude
of these instantaneous responses are much larger than the empirical responses of these
macroeconomic variables to an FG surprise over a two year horizon.
Section 2 shows that an FG shock which moves the 8-quarter-ahead interest rate ex-
pectations also moves interest rate expectations at preceding horizons significantly, both
statistically and economically, in the US during the first ZLB period. Thus, using an es-
timated FG shock (the black shock), one can measure the degree to which the FG puzzle
gets larger. Figure 5 also plots the model-implied responses of macroeconomic variables
to an estimated FG shock under sticky prices and RE. It can clearly be seen that the in-
stantaneous responses of all variables are more than two times larger while the quadratic
distance between the empirical and model-implied impulse responses (the χ2 test statistic)
gets more than five times larger as presented in Table 2. Hence the FG puzzle gets much
more difficult to address.
1.5.2 Adding Bounded Rationality in the Sticky Price Model
In this subsubsection, I discuss whether introducing BR in a sticky price model is sufficient
to fully explain the FG puzzle implied by an estimated FG shock.
First, I discuss whether adding BR to a sticky price model is sufficient to address the FG
puzzle implied by a one-period FG shock. In particular, I estimate the sticky price model
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with BR by choosing the cognitive discount factor, µ , that minimizes the distance between
the empirical and model-implied impulse responses. Table 2 reports that the corresponding
χ2 test statistic is 17, implying that the empirical and model-implied impulse responses
are not statistically different from each other.22 Table 3 presents the estimated cognitive
discount factor as 0.59, an empirically plausible value which is close to the one estimated
by Gabaix (2020).23 Note that the cognitive discount factor is estimated very precisely
given the restrictions of the model where the only source of uncertainty is the FG shock.
Thus, unlike the empirical CIs which are obtained through model-free local projections and
are prone to various sources of uncertainty, the model-implied CIs are very tight.
Next, I show that the BR framework is not sufficient to fully explain the FG puzzle
implied by an estimated FG shock. Figure 6 plots the model-implied impulse responses.
As reported in Table 3, the model-implied impulse responses still match the data. However,
the implied cognitive discount factor, µ , is implausibly small: 0.21.24 Figure 9 plots the
implied fit of the model ∀µ ∈ [0,1]. For any µ > 0.42, the model-implied impulse responses
cannot match their empirical counterparts at the 5% significance level. Hence, even the
largest µ that the model needs to marginally fit the data is implausibly small.
22The critical value with 26 degrees of freedom (number of moments matched minus the number of esti-
mated parameters) is 38.89 at the 5% significance level.
23Gabaix (2020) employs a Bayesian estimation for the US with a macroeconomic dataset that spans more
than five decades. For the case where all agents suffer from cognitive myopia by the same amount, he finds
the cognitive discount factor, µ , as 0.64 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.42, 0.83].
24It is well below the discount factor estimated by Gabaix (2020) whose mean estimate is 0.64 with a
standard error of 0.11. More intuitively, it implies that the BR expectations of any deviation from the steady
state is almost three orders of magnitude smaller than its RE counterpart over a yearly horizon.
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If separate cognitive discount factors are estimated for households and firms simulta-
neously, the estimated cognitive discount factor is 0 for households and 0.65 for firms.25
Hence, the implausibly small cognitive discount factor is driven by the mismatch between
the empirical and model-implied impulse responses of output and working hours.
I conclude that the approach of introducing a particular discount mechanism in a sticky
price model is not sufficient to fully explain the FG puzzle per se since the discussed BR
framework is the best performing discount mechanism among the most cited papers.26
1.5.3 Adding Delphic Interpretation in the Sticky Price Model
Next, I explore the implications of allowing agents to interpret an FG shock as Delphic
with a certain probability on addressing the FG puzzle implied by an estimated FG shock.
Note that the decomposition of central bank communication into Delphic and Odyssean
components has crucial implications for monetary policy. If a central bank is intended to
stimulate the economy by committing itself to an interest rate path, the Delphic interpreta-
tion creates unintended consequences as macroeconomic expectations, such as inflation or
growth, are adjusted downwards. Motivated by this discussion in the FG literature, I show
that allowing for a plausible probability of Delphic interpretation in a sticky price model is
sufficient to explain the FG puzzle implied by an estimated FG shock.
25As expected, the model fits the data better (χ2 = 12) with an additional free parameter.
26Note that introducing multiple discount mechanisms (e.g. lack of common knowledge as in Angeletos
and Lian (2018) or uninsurable income shocks as in McKay et al. (2016)) would clearly imply larger discount
factors to match the empirical impulse responses.
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I estimate the sticky price model with Delphic interpretation by choosing the prob-
ability of Delphic interpretation, ψ , that minimizes the quadratic distance between the
model-implied and empirical impulse responses. Table 3 presents the estimated Delphic
interpretation probability, ψ , as 0.39 when other parameters are calibrated to their base-
line values in Table 1. This is an empirically plausible estimate for the US.27 The χ2 test
statistic implies that the model-implied impulse responses are not significantly different
from their empirical counterparts. Figure 7 plots the model-implied and empirical impulse
responses.28 As presented in Figure 9, the model fits the data well for any ψ ∈ [0.33,0.50].
These results are robust to alternative calibrations of other parameters as reported in Table
4.
By introducing uncertainty regarding the nature of the FG communication, I show that a
plausible probability of Delphic interpretation is sufficient to explain the larger FG puzzle.
Thus, this novel framework, which is motivated by the opposing implications of committing
to a lower interest rate path on future macroeconomic expectations, is a useful tool that can
be embedded in the baseline sticky price model to explain the FG puzzle.
27Following Campbell et al. (2017), I empirically identify the Delphic component of FG surprises in the
US for the ZLB period (ending in 2014 due to the five year lag in the Greenbook data). I find that the size of
the Delphic component is around a third of the size of the FG surprise.
28As ψ is estimated very precisely with a standard error of 0.002, the model-implied CIs are very tight.
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1.5.4 The Sticky Information Model
After proposing an effective framework that explains the FG puzzle which emerges in a
standard sticky price model, I discuss whether an alternative source of nominal rigidity
proposed in this line of literature can also address the larger FG puzzle.
The sticky information model deviates from the fully forward looking nature of stan-
dard sticky price models. This is due to a different set of assumptions. For instance, since
only a fraction of firms can update their prices under Calvo (1983) pricing, they choose
the average optimal price in the near future. Under sticky information assumption, since
all firms can update their prices, they choose the optimal price of the current period. How-
ever, only a fraction of them choose to make a fully informed decision (due to the cost
of obtaining information) while others use previously available information. Thus, while
inflation and output are determined by future expectations under sticky price models, they
are pinned down by the sum of current and past expectations of today’s inflation and output
under the sticky information model. Therefore, a policy shock about the future has milder
effects.
Since the sticky information model is not as forward looking as the sticky price model,
introducing a one-period FG shock or an estimated FG shock does not induce a signifi-
cant difference in the response of macroeconomic variables. Table 2 reports that the χ2
test statistic implied by a one-period FG shock is 18, while it is 31 in the presence of an
estimated FG shock under baseline calibration. Hence, employing an estimated FG shock
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does not drastically change the model-implied impulse responses in the sticky information
model. Note that these results are highly sensitive to the presence of inattentive consumers.
When only firms have sticky information (i.e. δ = 1) as often proposed in the literature,
the mismatch between the model-implied and empirical impulse responses to an estimated
FG shock is still large (χ2 = 580). However, the implied puzzle in the sticky information
model with only inattentive firms is much smaller than the one in the standard sticky price
model as highlighted in this line of literature (see e.g. Kiley (2016)).
In the presence of inattentive consumers, the fraction of consumers who update their
information sets each period, δ , is calibrated to 0.08 under baseline calibration following
the estimate of Reis (2009) for the US. I relax this assumption and find that the level of
δ that best matches the empirical impulse responses is 0.04, as shown in Table 3. Figure
8 plots the model-implied impulse responses to an estimated FG shock under δ = 0.04.
Figure 9 further shows that the model can fit the data well with any information update
frequency parameter, δ , of less than 10% for consumers. This result is consistent with
the estimate of Reis (2009)29 who reports a 95% CI for this parameter in the US as [0.03,
0.16].30 Hence, I conclude that the puzzle can also be addressed by a sticky information
29Reis (2009) conducts a Bayesian estimation for the US data with macro data that spans two decades.
30Note that the estimate of Reis (2009) is smaller than the findings of the consumer survey literature
which reports that households update their inflation expectations once a year in the US (see e.g. Carroll
(2003)). However, setting the information update frequency parameter, δ , to 0.25 with the assumption that
households attain full information once they update their information sets would create an upward bias given
the implausibly low or high estimates of inflation (e.g. more than 10% for the next quarter) in consumer
surveys. An additional source of upward bias implied by surveys that rely on repeat participants is learning-
through-survey effects (see e.g. Kim and Binder (2020)).
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general equilibrium model regardless of the type of the introduced FG shock (i.e. one-
period or estimated).31
1.6 Conclusion
Motivated by the response of interest rate expectations to FG surprises during the ZLB
period, I show that the conventional way of introducing an FG shock in the literature is not
empirically plausible. Since an estimated FG shock can be captured as a sequence of future
policy shocks, the implied FG puzzle is much larger than it is typically characterized in this
line of literature.
Given a larger puzzle, I show that a sticky price model with bounded rationality, which
is the best performing discount mechanism among those in the most cited papers within
this literature, cannot fully explain the puzzle per se with an empirically plausible degree
of bounded rationality. Instead, I show that allowing agents to update their macroeconomic
expectations in the pessimistic direction following an FG easing in a standard sticky price
model explains the larger puzzle. Lastly, I show that the puzzle can also be addressed by a
sticky information general equilibrium model.
31Introducing BR or Delphic interpretation in the sticky information model does not improve its fit. Esti-
mating δ simultaneously with µ or ψ yields the same δ while µ and ψ are estimated as 1 and 0, respectively.
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Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Source
β 0.99 1% Discount Rate
σ 1 Log Utility
ϕ 1 Gali (2008)
φπ 1.5 Taylor (1999)
φy 0.5 Taylor (1999)
ε 6 Steady state markup of 20%
θp 0.25 1-Year Aggregate Duration of Price
µ 1 Rational Expectations
ψ 0 No Delphic Interpretation
δ 0.08 Reis (2009)
Note: The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. Parameters in the lower panel are estimated in each
model specification. Their baseline calibrations are given in this table.
Table 2: Model Fit under Different Cases
χ2 Test Statistics and p-values One-Period Shock Estimated Shock
Baseline Sticky Price Model χ2 3,449 19,630
p-value (0) (0)
Sticky Price Model with BR χ2 17 17
p-value (0.91) (0.91)
Sticky Price Model with Delphic Interpretation χ2 19 18
p-value (0.83) (0.89)
Calibrated Sticky Information Model χ2 18 31
p-value (0.88) (0.22)
Estimated Sticky Information Model χ2 18 20
p-value (0.88) (0.78)
Note: The critical value for 5% significance with 26 degrees of freedom (number of moments matched
minus the number of estimated structural parameters) is 38.89 at the 5% significance level. χ2 test statistics
are the values of the objective function in (19). The one-period and estimated shocks are as in Figure 1.
37
Table 3: Estimated Values of the Structural Parameters
µ ψ δ
One-Period Shock
Sticky Prices with BR 0.59
(0.01)





Sticky Prices with BR 0.21
(0.01)




Note: Estimated GMM standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are not valid on the boundary. The
estimated values of µ , ψ and δ are the values that minimize the objective function in (19). The GMM
standard errors are constructed as in (21). The one-period and estimated shocks are as in Figure 1.
Table 4: Probability of Delphic Interpretation Estimations under Different Calibrations
φy = 0.125 φπ = 1.01 σ = 2 ϕ = 2 ε = 11 θp = 0.15
p-value 0.88 0.75 0.80 0.87 0.89 0.64
ψ 0.10 0.43 0.19 0.40 0.39 0.39
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Note: Each column shows the alternative calibration of a single parameter. The remaining parameters are
calibrated to their original values given in Table 1. Reported ψ values minimize the χ2 test statistics given in
(19). The p-values that correspond to the minimum χ2 test statistics are reported. The GMM standard errors
are constructed as in (21).
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Figure 1: Modeling an FG Shock: One-Period vs Estimated























Used in the Literature
Notes: Modeled shock to the path of the nominal interest rate. The black line shows the estimated FG shock
for the ZLB period while the red line shows the widely used FG shock in the literature. The black line is
constructed using the coefficient estimates of the FG surprise in Equation (1).
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Figure 2: Survey Expectations of the 3-Month Treasury Yield at the Zero Lower Bound




















Expected Path of the 3-Month Treasury Yield
Notes: The solid black line shows the 3-month Treasury yield at the ZLB period in the US. The dashed red
lines show the Bluechip survey expectations of the 3-month Treasury yield for the next four quarters.
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Figure 3: Empirical FG and LSAP Surprises during the ZLB



























Notes: The blue line shows the FG surprise while the red line depicts the LSAP surprise for each FOMC
announcement during the ZLB period. The empirical identification methodology is as described in Section
2.2. An FG surprise moves the 2-year interest rate expectations while an LSAP surprise moves the 10-year
rate by the pp given on the vertical axis.
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Figure 4: The Response of Interest Rate Expectations to an FG Surprise






















Notes: Solid line shows the coefficient estimates of the high-frequency response of the first 8 Eurodollar
futures rates to an FG easing during the ZLB period as described in equation (1). It shows the change in the
interest rate expectations in response to an FG surprise that moves two-year interest rate expectations down
by 25 bps. The dashed lines show the 95% CIs.
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Figure 5: Larger FG Puzzle: Baseline Sticky Price Model








































































































Notes: The model-implied impulse responses are under baseline calibration. The impulse responses of
macroeconomic variables to an estimated FG shock are plotted in black while the responses to a one-period
FG shock are plotted in red. The model-implied impulse responses do not have a CI since the model is fully
calibrated. 68% CIs of the empirical impulse responses are constructed using Newey-West standard errors
with a maximum lag of 1.5×horizon. The sticky price model is as described in Section 3.1.
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Figure 6: Sticky Price Model with Bounded Rationality (Cognitive Discount Factor = 0.21)













































































































Notes: The model-implied impulse responses are under baseline calibration and estimated µ , the cognitive
discount factor. GMM standard errors are used to construct the modeled 68% CIs while Newey-West
standard errors with a maximum lag of 1.5×horizon are used to construct the empirical 68% CIs. Note that
the model-implied impulse responses are estimated much more precisely than the model-free local
projections since the former imposes all the restrictions of the model. The introduced shock is an estimated
FG shock as the black line in Figure 1. The sticky price model with BR is as described in Sections 3.1 and
3.2. Estimated µ = 0.21, implying that the BR expectations of any deviation from the steady state is almost
three orders of magnitude smaller than its RE counterpart over a yearly horizon. Note that all variables
(except for the price level) jump back to their steady states after the 8th period.
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Figure 7: Sticky Price Model with Delphic Interpretation (Delphic Interpretation = 0.39)













































































































Notes: The model-implied impulse responses are under baseline calibration and estimated ψ , probability of
Delphic interpretation. GMM standard errors are used to construct the modeled 68% CIs while Newey-West
standard errors with a maximum lag of 1.5×horizon are used to construct the empirical 68% CIs. Note that
the model-implied impulse responses are estimated much more precisely than the model-free local
projections since the former imposes all the restrictions of the model. The introduced shock is an estimated
FG shock as the black line in Figure 1. The sticky price model with Delphic interpretation is as described in
Sections 3.1 and 3.3. Estimated ψ = 0.39, implying a Delphic interpretation of 39%. Note that all variables
(except for the price level) jump back to their steady states after the 8th period.
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Figure 8: Sticky Information Model (Information Update Frequency of Consumers = 0.04)













































































































Notes: The model-implied impulse responses are under baseline calibration and estimated δ , the
information update frequency of consumers. GMM standard errors are used to construct the modeled 68%
CIs while Newey-West standard errors with a maximum lag of 1.5×horizon are used to construct the
empirical 68% CIs. Note that the model-implied impulse responses are estimated much more precisely than
the model-free local projections since the former imposes all the restrictions of the model. The introduced
shock is an estimated FG shock as the black line in Figure 1. The sticky information model is as described
in Section 3.4. Estimated δ = 0.04, implying that 4% of consumers update their information sets every
quarter. Note that all variables (except for the price level) gradually converge back to their steady states after
the 8th period.
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Figure 9: Test of Model Specification













































Notes: The implied fit of the model under different values of µ , ψ and δ . The 5% significance level is
plotted with a dashed red line. P-values above the critical value imply that the model-implied impulse
responses are not statistically different from their empirical counterparts. The largest p-value indicates the
structural parameter that best fits the data, i.e. µ = 0.21, 0.39 and δ = 0.04 (as given in Table 3).
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Chapter 2
2 Unconventional Monetary Policy Surprises: Delphic or
Odyssean?
2.1 Introduction
The conventional policy tool of the Federal Reserve (Fed) effectively hit the zero lower
bound (ZLB) in December 2008 during the Great Recession. Consequently, the commu-
nication about the future path of the policy rate, i.e. forward guidance (FG), gained more
importance although it had been an active policy tool since the Fed had started to issue de-
tailed statements after Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements. Another
unconventional monetary policy (UMP), large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs), was initiated
in March 2009 to further stimulate the economy by lowering the long-term interest rates.
While the primary goal of these accommodative UMPs was to loosen the financial
conditions to further stimulate the economy through promising lower medium to long term
interest rates, newly emerging empirical studies document the surprising implications these
accommodative policies had on private macroeconomic expectations (e.g. Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018)). Campbell et al. (2012) coined the terms Delphic and Odyssean in ref-
erence to Homer’s epic, Odyssey. A Delphic policy refers to the component of a policy
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announcement where the public learns the central bank’s perception of the macroeconomic
outlook while an Odyssean policy is the commitment of the central bank to a particular
path for the policy rate, independent of future macroeconomic conditions. This theoretical
decomposition of a central bank communication has crucial implications for monetary pol-
icy. If the central bank intends to stimulate the economy by committing itself to an interest
rate path, the Delphic interpretation creates unintended consequences as macroeconomic
expectations, such as inflation or growth, are adjusted downwards.
This paper first shows that both FG and LSAP surprises could be decomposed into
Delphic and Odyssean components. This is a novel identification for the LSAP surprise.
Thus, this paper argues that central bank communication of purchasing more assets than
anticipated by market participants could either signal a “bad” macroeconomic outlook or
looser financial conditions in the future by committing to lower long rates. In particular,
the Delphic components of FG and LSAP surprises are identified as the fraction of a UMP,
which is correlated with the difference between the Fed’s and market participants’ macroe-
conomic expectations, following a methodology similar to the one proposed by Campbell
et al. (2017).
Then, this paper documents the plausibility of the proposed Delphic and Odyssean
decomposition. In particular, the Delphic and the Odyssean components have the oppo-
site impact on macroeconomic expectations of unemployment, growth and inflation in the
US over various horizons, along with growth and inflation expectations in other advanced
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and large emerging market economies for the following year. Bauer and Swanson (2020)
recently pointed out the relevance of macroeconomic news revealed before the FOMC an-
nouncements in understanding the response of macroeconomic expectations to monetary
policy surprises. I conduct a robustness check on the sign and the significance of my re-
sults. I show that the economic and statistical significance of the Delphic components are
robust to taking the most recent economic news revealed before the FOMC announcement
into account.
Furthermore, I document the high frequency responses of US Treasury yields, the US
dollar and the S&P 500 to Delphic and Odyssean components. While the yield curve
and exchange rate are very responsive with the expected signs, the stock market is not
responsive to UMPs during the ZLB period.32 I also estimate the daily responses of the
stock market and yield curve volatility measures, and corporate spreads. I find that the
riskier bonds are more sensitive to Delphic policies.
Related Literature This paper is related to a number of different lines of literature.
Following Kuttner (2001), the event study literature identified the conventional monetary
policy surprise, the target surprise, as the change in the current month or one-month-ahead
Fed funds futures rate. At the ZLB, the variation in this monetary policy surprise is clearly
zero. Gürkaynak et al. (2005) extend this methodology by identifying a second significant
32Note that Jarocinski and Karadi (2020) disentangle the Delphic and Odyssean components of conven-
tional monetary policy surprises, i.e. the 30-minute change in the 3-month Fed funds futures rate, using the
30-minute stock market response around FOMC announcements between 1990-2016.
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monetary policy factor, the future path of the policy rate, in other words, FG. They fur-
ther show that these two factors almost fully explain the movement of the term structure
around FOMC announcements. After the initiation of the LSAPs, a new line of research
that separates the surprise effects of different UMPs emerged. Rogers et al. (2018) and
Swanson (2020) disentangle the effects of FG and LSAP surprises, extending the method-
ology in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) to the ZLB period. Swanson (2020) shows that FG and
LSAP surprises almost fully explain the movement of the term structure around FOMC an-
nouncements during the ZLB. I use the approach in Rogers et al. (2018) to identify UMPs
in the US.
An empirical body of research provides evidence that macroeconomic expectations
might improve following a monetary policy tightening (or vice versa) to the contrary of
what standard theory would suggest. Romer and Romer (2000) show that inflation expec-
tations are adjusted in the opposite direction at certain time periods. This work is followed
by Campbell et al. (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) who document similar op-
posite responses of unemployment and growth expectations to FG communication, respec-
tively. Coiobon et al. (2019) document how different forms of communication influence
the inflation expectations of individuals empirically. They propose policy prescriptions for
central banks about how to communicate to the public. For the same purpose, empirically
decomposing an FG surprise into its Delphic and Odyssean components is essential for
future policy actions.
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Campbell et al. (2017) propose an empirical methodology to disentangle the Delphic
component of an FG surprise. This method uses the difference between the Fed’s and
private macroeconomic expectations. Assuming that the Fed’s perception of the macroe-
conomy is inferred by the FOMC announcement, which was particularly detailed in the
last decade, Campbell et al. (2017) label the fraction of the FG surprise that is explained
by the Fed’s distinct perception of the macroeconomy, i.e. the deviation of their macro
expectations from private expectations, the Delphic component. As one would expect in
theory, they further show that private expectations respond to the Delphic component with
an opposite sign (e.g. a Delphic easing lowers growth expectations). Similarly, Jarocinski
and Karadi (2020) separate the information conveyed by the Fed into monetary policy and
the Fed’s assessment of the economic outlook. Andrade and Ferroni (2021) identify the
Delphic and Odyssean components of FG communication in the Euro Area. In particular,
they assume that an FG tightening has a Delphic component if it raises the slope of the
term structure of interest rates and generates a positive variation in inflation expectations. I
follow a methodology similar to the one suggested in Campbell et al. (2017).
Apart from the empirical identification of these components, there is a newly emerg-
ing line of theoretical literature that discusses whether the central banks should employ
Odyssean or Delphic policies. Andrade et al. (2019) construct a structural framework in
a standard New Keynesian model where agents have heterogenous beliefs with regards to
the nature of an FG communication in a liquidity trap. They show a crucial FG trade-off
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between the optimism of those who believe the central bank can commit and the induced
excess pessimism of non-believers. In related work, Barthelemy and Mengus (2016) argue
that signaling Odyssean FG cannot take place after a liquidity trap begins. Bassetto (2019)
discusses the cheap talk aspect of an FG communication. I document that a mixture of
Delphic and Odyssean policies has opposing implications on macroeconomic expectations
without taking a stance on the optimality of either policy.
The body of literature that documents the real and financial impacts of an FG surprise
without segregating the Delphic and Odyssean components is vast. Campbell et al. (2019)
show the limits of an FG shock in a structural model of imperfect communication. Bundick
and Smith (2020) document the dynamic effects of an FG shock. In particular, they match
the empirical effects of an FG shock, measured by a structural VAR, with the impulse
responses implied by a standard model of nominal rigidity. The studies that employ a stan-
dard model of nominal rigidity introduce a discount framework to address the FG puzzle,
i.e. the overestimation of the effects of an FG shock by a standard model.33 The first
chapter discusses how to model an FG shock and address the implied FG puzzle in detail.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the identification of
the Delphic and Odyssean components of UMP surprises. Section 3 presents the responses
33Other examples include: Del Negro et al. (2015) who introduce probability of dying, Gabaix (2020) who
defines a discount parameter due to cognitive myopia, McKay et al. (2016) who employ uninsurable income
shocks and borrowing constraints, Angeletos and Lian (2018) who remove common knowledge, Campbell
et al. (2017) who introduce preferences for government bonds, Campbell and Weber (2018) who introduce
imperfect credibility, and Farhi and Werning (2019) who employ bounded rationality and incomplete markets
simultaneously.
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of domestic and international private expectations. Section 4 discusses the response of
asset prices to decomposed UMPs. Section 5 shows the robustness of the identified Delphic
components to macroeconomic news revealed before the FOMC announcements. Section
6 concludes.
2.2 Delphic and Odyssean UMP Surprises
2.2.1 Identification of FG and LSAP Surprises in the ZLB Period
First, I identify FG and LSAP surprises following a similar methodology as in Rogers
et al. (2018). I construct FG surprises as the 120-minute change (from 15 minutes before
the FOMC announcement to 1 hour and 45 minutes after the announcement) in the 8th
Eurodollar futures rate, i.e. the market expectations of what the short rates in the US will
be roughly in two years.34 I assume that term premia do not change over this small interval
following the literature (e.g. Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005),
Evans and Marshall (1998)).35 This factor is highly correlated (88%) with the path factor
obtained through rotating the first two principle components of asset price movements as in
34The choice of Eurodollar futures to capture the interest rate expectations is due to the liquidity of these
assets. Their high frequency response to FOMC announcements within a 120-minute window is highly
volatile. One might argue that the interest rate expectations in the US are better captured by the OIS rates.
However, the OIS futures are less volatile. In order to control for the difference between the interest rate
implied by Eurodollar futures (the LIBOR rate) and the OIS rate, I check the daily response of the LIBOR-
OIS spread to an FG surprise and find no economic significance. The spread moves a basis point in response
to an FG surprise that moves the 8-quarter-ahead interest rate expectations by 25 basis points.
35I also find that the term premium component of the two year rates do not significantly move at daily
frequency around FOMC announcements during the ZLB period.
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Gürkaynak et al. (2005).36 Note that the Fed funds futures rate, i.e. the market expectations
of what the Fed funds rate will be at the end of the current month, and its surprises were
practically zero during the ZLB period.
The asset price movements around FOMC announcements at the ZLB can be explained
by the two principal components of the changes in interest rate expectations at different
horizons as shown in Swanson (2020). These principal components can be rotated to have
the structural interpretation of an FG and LSAP surprise. Following Rogers et al. (2018),
I identify LSAP surprises using the high frequency change in the 10-year Treasury yields
and the FG surprise since LSAP surprises target long rates directly while FG also influence
long rates through changes in shorter term interest rate expectations. Formally, I regress
the 120-minute change in the 10-year Treasury yields around FOMC announcements on
the FG surprise and label the residuals as the LSAP surprise. Thus, the high frequency
change in the 10-year Treasury yields is explained by the combination of FG and LSAP
surprises by construction. Figure 10 shows the identified empirical FG and LSAP surprises
during the ZLB period.
2.2.2 Extracting the Delphic Component of a UMP
Woodford (2012) and Campbell et al. (2012) discuss the ambiguous implications of com-
36I employ this method instead of rotating the first two principle components of asset price movements as
in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) because of the ZLB during which the short-term interest rate expectations were
very low. While the Gürkaynak et al. (2005) approach is linked to a combination of interest rates spanning
various maturities, most of which were unusually low at the ZLB, this approach directly links the FG surprise
to the two-year rate.
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mitting to a lower interest rate in the near future for macroeconomic expectations. In par-
ticular, when a central bank is constrained by the ZLB, a communication that the policy
rate will stay at the ZLB for longer than the public expected could either be interpreted as
“bad news” about the macroeconomic outlook or “good news” as financial conditions will
be looser for a longer period of time.
Campbell et al. (2012) define Delphic FG as the component of a monetary policy an-
nouncement where the public learns the macroeconomic expectations of the central bank
and infers possible future policy actions. On the other hand, an Odyssean FG surprise is
the commitment of the central bank to a particular path for the policy rate regardless of
the future macroeconomic conditions. Formally, Campbell et al. (2017) identify the Del-
phic FG as the fraction of an FG surprise that is correlated with the difference between the
macroeconomic expectations of the Federal Reserve and the market participants.
Similar to the ambiguous implications of the future path of the policy rate for macroe-
conomic expectations, a monetary policy announcement which is intended to lower long
rates through asset purchases could have the same opposing impact on private expectations
in principal. For instance, a larger than expected asset purchase could either be interpreted
as “bad news” about the macroeconomic outlook or “good news” as long rates will be
lower. Thus, I apply a methodology, which is similar to the one proposed by Campbell
et al. (2017) to extract the Delphic component of an FG surprise, to identify the Delphic
component of an LSAP surprise.
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First, I take the difference between the Greenbook forecast and the most recent Bluechip
forecast37 of GDP growth and CPI inflation before every scheduled FOMC announcement
from January 200838 to December 2014.39 Unlike Campbell et al. (2017), I do not include
unemployment forecasts due to the very high correlation between GDP growth and unem-
ployment expectations. I consider the nowcast and the forecast for the next four quarters
of GDP growth and CPI inflation due to the limit on the Bluechip forecast horizon. Thus,
I create a dataset of 10 variables. Then, as in Gürkaynak et al. (2005), I take the short and
the long factor of each macro variable forecast by taking their first two principal compo-
nents and rotating them such that the short component moves one-to-one with the nowcast.
Hence, my dataset of the differences between the Greenbook and Bluechip forecasts for the
next year is reduced to four variables: the short and long factors of GDP growth and CPI
inflation.
I regress both the LSAP surprise and the FG surprise as identified in Section 2.1 on these
four factors, which show the difference between the Fed’s and private agents’ perception
37Following Campbell et al. (2017), I match a Greenbook forecast, which is dated a week before the FOMC
announcement, with the most recent Bluechip forecast, which is published on the 10th of every month. If the
Greenbook is dated on the 10th of a month, I match it with the Bluechip forecast of the same date.
38Scheduled FOMC meetings of 2008 are included in my sample since the target Fed funds rate surprises,
i.e. 120-minute change in the current or one-quarter-ahead Fed funds futures rate around FOMC announce-
ments, were very small (around 2.5 basis points on average in absolute magnitude).
39The dataset is not yet extended to October 2015, the end of the ZLB period, as the Greenbook data
becomes available with a 5 year lag.
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of the macroeconomic outlook, and their lags.40
































where UMPt is the LSAP surprise or FG surprise, yt is the GDP factor and πt is the CPI
inflation factor. s superscript refers to the short factor while the l superscript is the long
factor.
Table 5 shows the results of both regressions. I use the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) to select the model that best explains the UMPs. While the BIC selects the model
with all four factors with their lags for the FG surprise, it chooses the model with only the
long growth factor and its lag for the LSAP surprise. Given the best model for each UMP,
I use the fitted values to identify the Delphic components. I conduct this analysis for the
ZLB period with 56 observations.41
The main novelty of this identification is the decomposition of the LSAP surprise into
its Delphic and Odyssean components. Besides, I employ BIC to pick the model that best
describes the Delphic components. Since I can observe the difference between the Fed’s
and private macroeconomic expectations up to a year, I assume the difference between the
two expectations is zero after a year.42 Thus, I label the residuals of each regression as the
40Following Campbell et al. (2017), the lags are added since the Fed could be revealing its perception about
the state of the economy with a lag.
41There are 8 scheduled FOMC announcements over 7 years.
42This assumption implies that there is no longer run Delphic component. The next section discusses the
plausibility of this assumption.
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Odyssean component, which is orthogonal to the Delphic component by construction.
Figures 11-12 plot the decomposed LSAP and FG surprises respectively. Delphic com-
ponents of both policies are larger in absolute magnitude in the earlier years of the ZLB,
when the uncertainty regarding the state of the economy was higher. As market partici-
pants learned more about the nature of the ZLB period, the difference between their and
the Fed’s macroeconomic expectations decreased, yielding smaller Delphic components
for both policies.
The decomposed UMPs plotted in Figures 11-12 support the plausibility of the method-
ology. A clear example of a policy rate commitment was announced in August 2011 when
the FOMC communicated that the policy rate will stay at the ZLB until mid-2013. Figure
11 shows that this FG communication is purely interpreted as an Odyssean FG surprise as
one would expect. Likewise, Figure 12 illustrates that the initiation of the LSAP policies
in March 2009 is mostly identified as a commitment to keeping long rates lower than the
public expected. However, there is a Delphic component to this LSAP easing since this un-
conventional policy was being introduced for the first time, simultaneously implying “bad
news” about the state of the economy.
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2.3 Response of Expectations to Decomposed UMPs
2.3.1 Domestic Private Expectations
Table 6 shows the response of private macroeconomic expectations to FG and LSAP sur-
prises, and their Delphic and Odyssean components. The first two columns report the
baseline regressions in which the monthly changes in the Bluechip forecasts of unemploy-
ment, GDP growth and inflation around FOMC announcements are regressed on the UMPs







LSAPLSAPt + εt (23)
where ∆BCh,it is the monthly change in the Bluechip forecast of macro variable i for h quar-
ters ahead, where h ∈ {0,1, ...,4}, around FOMC announcements. FG and LSAP surprises
are as described in Section 2.1. t ∈ T where T = 56, the number of FOMC announcements.
The following four columns report the results of the decomposed regressions in which
the monthly Bluechip forecast changes are regressed on the Delphic and Odyssean compo-











OLSAPOLSAPt + εt (24)
where DFG and DLSAP stand for the Delphic components of FG and LSAP surprises
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respectively while OFG and OLSAP refer to the Odyssean components. All components
are constructed as described in Section 2.2.
The hypothesis is that a Delphic easing, whether FG or LSAP, should increase un-
employment expectations, and decrease growth and inflation expectations since it signals
“bad” news about the macroeconomy. On the other hand, the Odyssean component should
have the opposite sign as it signals that the financial conditions will be looser.
In the top panel, the baseline regressions show that the unemployment expectations
respond to an FG surprise with a negative sign at shorter horizons.43 Counterintuitively,
this means that an FG easing increases the unemployment expectations in the US. These
inverse signs are consistent with the findings of Campbell et al. (2017) who were moti-
vated by these findings and hypothesized that the inverse sign should be due to the Delphic
component of an FG surprise. The next four columns show the results of the decomposed
regression. As expected, the inverse sign of an FG surprise is due to the Delphic component
of an FG surprise. Moreover, the estimated impact of a Delphic FG surprise on unemploy-
ment expectations is economically significant. The Delphic component of an FG easing44
increases the current and one-quarter-ahead unemployment expectations by around 50 basis
points (bps) during the ZLB period.
As for the LSAP surprise, the baseline regression of unemployment expectations does
43These results are marginally insignificant at 10%.
44The unit of FG surprises is standardized to a 25 basis point change in 2-year-ahead interest rate expec-
tations in the US around FOMC announcements. Note that the average size an FG surprise plotted in Figure
10 is 22 basis points in absolute value.
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not yield any significant coefficients. However, the decomposed regression shows that the
Delphic components of an LSAP easing, which signals bad news about the macroecon-
omy, also increases the unemployment expectations at all horizons with one standard error
significance. Thus, while the estimated coefficients of the Delphic FG are similar to the
findings of Campbell et al. (2017), the marginal significance of the Delphic LSAP coeffi-
cients with the expected sign is a complementary finding which supports the hypothesis of
extending the Delphic interpretation of a monetary policy surprise to LSAPs. Moreover,
over longer horizons, an Odyssean LSAP easing lowers the unemployment expectations.
This finding is consistent with the assumption that the residuals of Equation (22) mostly
contain information about Odyssean FG rather than longer-run Delphic FG.
The findings in the other two panels of Table 6 are also consistent with the expected
signs of the Delphic and Odyssean components of UMPs. The statistically significant co-
efficients are also economically significant. The baseline regressions of both growth and
inflation expectations on any horizon report an expected sign, i.e. an easing policy increases
growth and inflation expectations. Moreover, the estimated impact of UMPs on growth and
inflation expectations during the ZLB period are large. While an LSAP easing45 increases
the growth expectations of the current quarter by around 1.5 percentage points, the same
LSAP surprise increases the inflation expectations of next quarter by about half a percent-
age point. The relatively smaller influence on inflation expectations is consistent with the
45Similarly, the unit of LSAP surprises is standardized to a 25 basis point change in the 10-year interest
rate expectations in the US around FOMC announcements.
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well-anchored inflation expectations in the US.
The decomposed regressions show that the conventional signs reported in the baseline
regressions operate through the Odyssean component of FG and LSAP policies.46 In par-
ticular, the positive impact of an LSAP easing on growth and inflation expectations are
significant over various horizons. All of these coefficients are due to the Odyssean compo-
nent of an LSAP surprise. Likewise, an FG easing is associated with an increase in inflation
expectations at shorter horizons, which is explained by the Odyssean component.47
2.3.2 Foreign Private Expectations
The Bluechip economic indicators report growth and inflation expectations in some ad-
vanced and large emerging market foreign economies for the following year. I conduct
the same regression analysis described in Equations (23)-(24) for this dataset. Table 7
shows that the responses of growth and inflation expectations for the Eurozone, the U.K.,
Japan, Canada, China and Brazil are also consistent with the expected signs of the Delphic
and Odyssean components of FG and LSAP surprises. This is a novel finding in this line
of literature. Besides, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients suggest that the mar-
kets expected significant spillovers of the US UMPs to other advanced and large emerging
market economies. The responses of growth and inflation expectations to the US UMPs
46Campbell et al. (2017) report only one significant coefficient in their baseline regressions for growth
expectations and three significant Delphic FG coefficients with the expected signs. They do not report signif-
icant findings for the response of inflation expectations.
47Although the Delphic LSAP surprise is significant with the wrong sign for a quarter ahead inflation
expectations, the Odyssean components of that regression are also significant with the correct signs.
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are mostly homogenous across these six countries both under baseline and decomposed
regressions.
A Delphic interpretation of a UMP easing in the US is expected to lower growth and
inflation expectations in other advanced and emerging market economies unambiguously
since it signals “bad” news about the US economy, and thus the global economic out-
look. On the other hand, an Odyssean interpretation of a UMP easing in the US could
imply higher or lower growth for other advanced and emerging market economies. While
the looser financial conditions could help economic activity, a depreciated dollar against
the local currency can hurt the competitiveness of domestic goods against the US goods.
However, foreign central banks often respond to lower competitiveness caused by the de-
preciated dollar through lowering their policy rates.48 The responsiveness of foreign central
banks to US monetary policy is consistent with the empirical documentation of the global
financial cycle induced by the US monetary policy in Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2019).
The results in Table 7 indicate that an Odyssean UMP in the US is interpreted as “good”
news in other advanced and large emerging market economies.
An important finding in the baseline regressions is that the FG surprise influence the
growth and inflation expectations with the expected sign, i.e. an easing increases the ex-
pectations. Thus, when the Fed communicates that the policy rate will remain at the ZLB
for longer than market participants expected, it is interpreted as “good” news about the
48If the foreign economy is constrained by the ZLB, the foreign central bank can undertake a UMP easing.
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global economic outlook. Due to Fed’s commitment to looser financial conditions for a
longer time period, market participants are optimistic about the growth prospects in the
upcoming year. While an FG easing significantly increases growth and inflation expecta-
tions in China, it also increases inflation expectations in Canada and growth expectations
in Brazil at a 10% significance level. All growth expectations increase in response to an
FG easing at one standard error significance.
On the other hand, an LSAP easing decreases growth and inflation expectations in other
advanced and large emerging market economies. Thus, the asset purchase program is in-
terpreted as a negative signal about the current state of the US economy, and thus the
global economy. While the growth expectations of Brazil are adjusted downwards very
significantly following an LSAP easing, the inflation expectations are also decreased sig-
nificantly in the Eurozone, the UK, Canada and China. Decomposed regressions show
that these inverse signs are due to the Delphic LSAP surprises. Moreover, the negative
impact of a Delphic LSAP easing is much stronger on the growth expectations of the for-
eign economies in the sample. For instance, the Delphic component of an LSAP easing
decreases the growth expectations more than a percentage point in the UK and around 80
bps in the Eurozone.
The decomposed regression results show that the Delphic and the Odyssean compo-
nents of FG and LSAP surprises have the expected signs. The expectation increasing im-
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pact of an FG surprise is due to the Odyssean component of an FG surprise.49 Likewise, the
expectation lowering impact of an LSAP easing is very significantly explained by the Del-
phic LSAP surprise for all countries in the sample. Furthermore, the estimated impact of
the Delphic LSAP surprise is economically large on growth expectations in other advanced
and large emerging market economies.
2.4 Response of Asset Prices to Decomposed UMPs
In this section, I present the responses of asset prices in the US to the Delphic and Odyssean
components of the FG and LSAP surprises. In particular, I present the high frequency
response of the US Treasury yields with maturities ranging from 3 months to 30 years, 5 and
10-year TIPS yields, the stock market index, and the EUR/USD exchange rate. Moreover, I
report the daily responses of corporate yields and spreads of firms with different investment
grade ratings.
The baseline regressions are estimated as:
∆APt = β0 +βFGFGt +βLSAPLSAPt + εt (25)
where ∆APt is the change in the given asset price around FOMC announcements. FG and
LSAP surprises are as described in Section 2.1. t ∈ T where T = 56, the number of FOMC
49The results are only insignificant for Japan.
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announcements. The decomposed regressions are estimated as:
∆APt = β0 +βDFGDFGt +βOFGOFGt +βDLSAPDLSAPt +βOLSAPOLSAPt + εt (26)
where DFG and DLSAP stand for the Delphic components of FG and LSAP surprises
respectively while OFG and OLSAP refer to the Odyssean components. All components
are constructed as described in Section 2.2.
2.4.1 Response of the Yield Curve
Table 8 reports the response of the yield curve to the UMPs. The baseline regression
shows that both the FG and LSAP surprises very significantly impact the risk-free rates at
different maturities. Not surprisingly, the FG surprise is more effective in moving the short
to medium term maturities while the LSAP surprise is more effective at longer maturities.
Likewise, both UMPs are effective in moving the TIPS rates at 5 and 10 year horizons.
While both UMPs are moving the yield curve in the expected direction, i.e. an easing
lowers the risk-free rates while a tightening increases them, I do not argue for a particular
distinction between the Delphic and the Odyssean channels of these policies. Consistent
with this prior, the decomposed regression results presented in the next four columns show
that two components always have the same sign and their magnitudes are not statistically
different from each other. Thus, UMPs influence the yield curve due to both components,
neither of which is more influential than the other.
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2.4.2 Response of Stock Prices and the US Dollar
Table 9 presents the high frequency response of the S&P 500 index and the EURUSD
exchange rate, the US dollar value of a Euro, around the FOMC announcements. The
120-minute response (from 15 minutes before the announcement to 1 hour and 45 minutes
after the announcement) of the stock market index does not significantly respond to UMPs,
and their Delphic and Odyssean components. On the other hand, the baseline regression
of the US dollar shows that half of the variation in the EURUSD exchange rate in a two-
hour window around an FOMC announcement is explained by the two UMPs. Thus, the
systematic relationship between the UMPs and the exchange rate is higher than the one
between the UMPs and stock prices. The direction of this relationship is as expected; an
easing depreciates the USD. The EURUSD exchange rate moves almost a percentage point
in response to an FG or LSAP easing.
In theory, the direction of the impact of Delphic and Odyssean components on the
exchange rate should be the same. While a Delphic easing, signaling “bad” economic
conditions in the US, should depreciate its currency through lower international demand
for US financial securities, an Odyssean easing, signaling commitment to lower interest
rates in the US, should also depreciate the currency for the same reason. The decomposed
regression results are consistent with this prior. Moreover, the estimated impact of Delphic
FG is larger than that of Odyssean FG as expected. However, the difference between these
estimated coefficients are not statistically significant.
68
2.4.3 Response of Volatility Measures
Table 10 illustrates the responses of volatility measures of the stock market and the yield
curve to UMPs along with their Delphic and Odyssean components. I employ the Volatility
Index (VIX) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, which is derived from the options
implied volatility of the S&P 500 index, and the Merrill Lynch Options Estimate (MOVE)
index, which is based on the options implied volatility of US Treasury yields of various
maturities. The regressions present the daily responses of the VIX and MOVE.
The results point out a striking difference between the impact of FG and LSAP policies
on the volatility measures which reflect the uncertainty associated with the stock market
and yield curve. Both baseline regressions suggest that FG and LSAP surprises have the
opposite impact on the uncertainty measures.50 While an FG easing decreases the stock
market and yield curve uncertainty, an LSAP easing increases both uncertainty measures.
The decomposed regressions show that both channels operate through commitment to lower
rates, i.e. the Odyssean components. The volatility decreasing impact of an Odyssean FG
easing is consistent with the findings of Bekaert et al. (2013), who find that a lax conven-
tional monetary policy decreases the volatility implied by the VIX. Thus, the uncertainty
increasing impact of an Odyssean LSAP easing is a distinct result compared to conventional
policies and the FG. This could be due to the uncertainty associated with the introduction
of LSAPs as a novel policy tool.
50The impact of LSAPs on the MOVE index is significant at 20%.
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2.4.4 Response of Corporate Yields and Spreads
Table 11 shows the response of corporate yields and spreads of firms with different invest-
ment grades, namely AAA, BAA and BBB. Since both FG and LSAP surprises decrease
the risk-free rates at different horizons, the corporate yields also go down as shown in the
first three lines of the baseline regressions. This decrease in the corporate yields are not
particularly due to the Delphic or the Odyssean components. The decomposed regression
results show that yields at different investment grade ratings are affected by the Delphic
and Odyssean components similarly.
A more interesting exercise is to assess the corporate spread responses of firms with
different risk levels. Baseline regressions show that a UMP easing increases the spread
between the risky and risk-free bonds. Thus, a UMP easing decreases the risky yields less
than the risk-free yields. There are two main mechanisms through which this could be
true. The first channel is mechanical: since the Fed is operating its LSAP policies mostly
through the 10-year Treasury bonds, it impacts the yields of these bonds more than other
type of bonds. Alternatively, the risk associated with the corporate bonds might be going
up, especially for low investment grade bonds.
The decomposed regressions are consistent with both mechanisms as the Delphic and
Odyssean components are both significant with a negative sign. However, the magnitude
of their impact varies across bond spreads with different levels of risk. The riskier bond
spreads are more sensitive to the Delphic component of an LSAP surprise since these bonds
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are more sensitive to aggregate risks. In particular, the absolute magnitude of the impact of
a Delphic LSAP surprise is statistically larger than the impact of the Odyssean component
for BBB-10Y spreads.51 Similarly, the safer bond spreads are more responsive to Odyssean
FG surprises. The size of the impact of an Odyssean FG surprise is statistically larger than
the impact of a Delphic FG for AAA-10Y spreads.52
2.5 Robustness Check: News Announcements
A recent concern on the existence of a Delphic FG is proposed by Bauer and Swanson
(2020) who build their argument on the availability of new public information about the
state of the economy between the Bluechip forecast and the FOMC announcement dates.
They argue that if market participants systematically underestimate (in absolute magnitude)
the Fed’s response to this new public information, the opposite relationship between pri-
vate macroeconomic expectations and monetary policy surprises is explained. However,
this argument is valid only if market participants systematically underestimate the Fed’s
response to news on average.
To empirically support their argument, Bauer and Swanson (2020) cite a finding from
earlier work: prior economic news are correlated with upcoming monetary policy sur-
51Note that there is no statistical difference between the impact of Delphic and Odyssean components of
LSAP surprises on safer bond spreads.
52The only exception to these set of results is reported in the decomposed regression for BBB-10Y spreads:
The magnitude of the impact of an Odyssean FG is larger than that of a Delphic FG. However, the statistical
significance of the difference between these two coefficients is weaker.
71
prises.53 Since economic news also influence private expectations, Bauer and Swanson
(2020) point out a possible omitted variable bias problem. After adding an economic
news variable, which captures information about the macroeconomy before the FOMC
announcement, as a control variable, they conclude that the opposite relationship between
private expectations and the policy surprise disappears. However, the implications of the
relationship between private expectations and policy surprises (a baseline regression) are
not conclusive since Delphic and Odyssean components could be canceling each other out
(or one component could be dominating the another).
As a robustness check, I include the most recent non-farm payrolls, industrial produc-
tion and CPI inflation news surprises (the difference between the actual release and survey
expectations) announced before the FOMC announcements as control variables in the re-
gressions presented in Table 6. Table 12 shows the responses of private expectations to
monetary policy surprises in the presence of macroeconomic news surprises as control
variables. The results show that both the significance and the magnitude of the estimated
coefficients are robust to adding macroeconomic news surprises as control variables.
Following the empirical methodology described in Section 2 provides a direct evidence
on the presence of a Delphic component for both FG and LSAP policies in the US. The
argument presented by Bauer and Swanson (2020) is built on the assumption that the Fed
53Miranda-Agrippino (2017) explains this by a risk premium required by investors to compensate them-
selves for the interest rate risk around FOMC announcements while Cieslak (2018) interprets this as the lack
of full information regarding Fed’s reaction function. The authors follow the latter explanation.
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and the market participants have the same information set about the macroeconomy (but
market participants underestimate Fed’s reaction function). However, I first extract the
difference between the ex-ante macroeconomic expectations of market participants and the
Fed. Then, I show that this difference is correlated with the upcoming UMPs, and the
opposite relationship between private macroeconomic expectations and monetary policy
surprises is explained by the fraction of UMPs that is correlated with the difference in
expectations.
2.6 Conclusion
I decompose FG and LSAP surprises into their Delphic and Odyssean components. This is
a novel identification for the LSAP surprise. While the Delphic components convey infor-
mation about the Fed’s perception of the current and the future states of the macroeconomy,
the Odyssean components inform agents about the additional commitment the central bank
makes to keep the medium and long rates low for a longer period of time. I identify the
Delphic component of a UMP surprise as its fraction which is correlated with the difference
between the Fed’s and market participants’ macroeconomic expectations.
I show that the Delphic and Odyssean components of FG and LSAP surprises have the
opposite impact on macroeconomic expectations of unemployment, growth and inflation
during the ZLB period in the US over various horizons. Besides, they also have the oppo-
site impact on the growth and inflation expectations of the following year in other advanced
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and large emerging market economies. Moreover, I document the high frequency responses
of the yield curve, the US dollar and the stock market to the Delphic and Odyssean com-
ponents. While the first two respond very significantly with the expected signs, I find that
the stock market is not responsive to UMPs. Lastly, I study the daily responses of volatil-
ity measures and corporate spreads, and find riskier bonds to be more sensitive to Delphic
policies.
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Table 5: Interaction of UMPs with the Fed’s Different View of the Macroeconomy
LSAP FG
Growth Short Factor 0.02 0.15∗∗
(0.04) (0.06)
Growth Long Factor 0.15∗∗ -0.01
(0.07) (0.09)
Inflation Short Factor -0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.05)
Inflation Long Factor 0.03 −0.15
(0.06) (0.09)
Growth Short Factor Lag -0.01 0.05
(0.04) (0.06)
Growth Long Factor Lag −0.11∗ 0.01
(0.06) (0.08)
Inflation Short Factor Lag 0.01 -0.003
(0.02) (0.05)






Note: White standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The sample size spans all scheduled FOMC announcements between January 2008
and December 2014. The LSAP and FG surprises are identified as described in Section 2.1. The long and
short factors are constructed as described in Section 2.2.
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Table 6: Response of Bluechip Forecasts to Decomposed UMPs
Baseline Regressions Decomposed Regressions
FG LSAP R2 DFG OFG DLSAP OLSAP R2
Unemployment
Nowcast -0.21 -0.17 0.1 -0.49** -0.14 -0.52 -0.04 0.16
(0.14) (0.28) (0.23) (0.12) (0.36) (0.25)
Q1 -0.2 -0.13 0.08 -0.49** -0.13 -0.55 0.03 0.17
(0.14) (0.27) (0.2) (0.13) (0.34) (0.24)
Q2 -0.15 0 0.04 -0.4* -0.09 -0.44 0.17 0.12
(0.14) (0.26) (0.22) (0.13) (0.35) (0.24)
Q3 -0.12 0.07 0.03 -0.44** -0.05 -0.5 0.29 0.17
(0.13) (0.22) (0.18) (0.12) (0.34) (0.21)
Q4 -0.07 0.11 0.02 -0.32* -0.02 -0.51 0.35 0.16
(0.14) (0.22) (0.18) (0.13) (0.36) (0.21)
Growth
Nowcast -0.45 -1.47** 0.16 -0.22 -0.5 -1.2 -1.57* 0.16
(0.39) (0.71) (0.7) (0.41) (1.36) (0.82)
Q1 -0.26 -1.1** 0.17 -0.21 -0.27 -0.53 -1.32** 0.18
(0.36) (0.53) (0.65) (0.32) (1.09) (0.6)
Q2 -0.41 -0.25 0.17 -0.43 -0.4* 0.46 -0.52 0.24
(0.26) (0.28) (0.5) (0.22) (0.55) (0.34)
Q3 -0.21 -0.14 0.11 -0.31 -0.19 0.15 -0.26 0.14
(0.18) (0.14) (0.31) (0.15) (0.32) (0.19)
Q4 -0.1 -0.19* 0.09 -0.23 -0.08 0.03 -0.27** 0.13
(0.13) (0.1) (0.23) (0.11) (0.26) (0.13)
Inflation
Nowcast -1.46* -0.99 0.2 -1.42 -1.46* 0.85 -1.7** 0.24
(0.74) (0.65) (0.96) (0.74) (1.26) (0.79)
Q1 -0.47** -0.46** 0.27 -0.85** -0.38** 0.39 -0.8*** 0.4
(0.21) (0.19) (0.34) (0.15) (0.42) (0.25)
Q2 -0.16 0.1 0.08 -0.27 -0.13 0.02 0.13 0.09
(0.11) (0.16) (0.22) (0.12) (0.25) (0.16)
Q3 0.03 -0.34*** 0.15 0.14 0 -0.24 -0.38*** 0.16
(0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.24) (0.14)
Q4 -0.06 -0.13** 0.09 -0.18 -0.04 -0.15 -0.12** 0.12
(0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06)
Note: White standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The sample size spans all scheduled FOMC announcements between January 2008
and December 2014. The dependent variables are the monthly updates of Bluechip forecasts around FOMC
announcements. The LSAP and FG surprises are identified as described in Section 2.1. The Delphic and
Odyssean components are constructed as described in Section 2.2.
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Table 7: Response of International Forecasts for the Following Year to Decomposed UMPs
Baseline Regressions Decomposed Regressions
FG LSAP R2 DFG OFG DLSAP OLSAP R2
Eurozone
Growth -0.36 0.36 0.16 -0.32 -0.37* 0.81** 0.18 0.19
(0.26) (0.22) (0.53) (0.22) (0.33) (0.22)
Inflation -0.04 0.15** 0.07 0 -0.05 0.28* 0.1 0.1
(0.04) (0.06) (0.1) (0.04) (0.16) (0.08)
United Kingdom
Growth -0.45 0.21 0.16 -0.48 -0.44* 1.15** -0.15 0.25
(0.32) (0.29) (0.65) (0.24) (0.43) (0.23)
Inflation -0.06 0.16** 0.06 -0.14 -0.05 0.26* 0.12 0.07
(0.06) (0.08) (0.17) (0.06) (0.15) (0.09)
Japan
Growth -0.33 0.27 0.15 -0.76 -0.23 0.84** 0.05 0.26
(0.25) (0.22) (0.47) (0.18) (0.34) (0.2)
Inflation 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.19 0.05 0.02
(0.06) (0.15) (0.18) (0.07) (0.22) (0.18)
Canada
Growth -0.43 0.27 0.19 -0.54 -0.4* 0.91*** 0.02 0.25
(0.3) (0.19) (0.57) (0.23) (0.33) (0.18)
Inflation -0.14* 0.4* 0.23 -0.08 -0.15* 0.58** 0.33 0.25
(0.08) (0.2) (0.16) (0.09) (0.27) (0.2)
China
Growth -0.18** 0.17 0.11 -0.25 -0.16* 0.65* -0.01 0.2
(0.07) (0.11) (0.21) (0.08) (0.34) (0.17)
Inflation -0.27** 0.24** 0.14 -0.27 -0.27** 0.54 0.12 0.15
(0.11) (0.11) (0.27) (0.1) (0.45) (0.19)
Brazil
Growth -0.34* 0.45*** 0.23 -0.44 -0.31** 1.01*** 0.24 0.29
(0.18) (0.16) (0.35) (0.14) (0.27) (0.16)
Inflation -0.72 6.4 0.04 -7.35 0.74 1.52 8.24 0.09
(1.31) (6.75) (7.53) (1.17) (4.07) (8.13)
Note: White standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The sample size spans all scheduled FOMC announcements between January 2008
and December 2014. The dependent variables are the monthly updates of Bluechip forecasts around FOMC
announcements. The LSAP and FG surprises are identified as described in Section 2.1. The Delphic and
Odyssean components are constructed as described in Section 2.2.
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Table 8: Response of the US Treasury Yields and TIPS to Decomposed UMPs
Baseline Regressions Decomposed Regressions
FG LSAP R2 DFG OFG DLSAP OLSAP R2
3-Month 0.01 0 0.05 0.02 0.01 0 0 0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
6-Month 0.04** 0 0.27 0.08*** 0.03** -0.03 0.01 0.33
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
2-Year 0.14*** 0.02 0.75 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.01 0.03 0.77
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
5-Year 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.96 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.96
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
10-Year 0.18*** 0.25*** 1 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 1
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
30-Year 0.09*** 0.21*** 0.73 0.08** 0.09*** 0.2*** 0.22*** 0.73
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05)
TIPS 5-Year 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.94 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.94
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
TIPS 10-Year 0.17*** 0.26*** 0.94 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.94
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Note: White standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The sample size spans all scheduled FOMC announcements between January 2008
and December 2014. The dependent variables are the 120-minute changes around FOMC announcements.
The LSAP and FG surprises are identified as described in Section 2.1. The Delphic and Odyssean
components are constructed as described in Section 2.2.
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Table 9: Response of Stock Prices and the USD to Decomposed UMPs
Baseline Regressions Decomposed Regressions
FG LSAP R2 DFG OFG DLSAP OLSAP R2
SPX -0.35 -0.94 0.11 -0.74 -0.26 -0.56 -1.09 0.13
(0.45) (0.78) (0.58) (0.48) (1.01) (0.86)
EURUSD -0.94*** -0.86** 0.5 -1.2*** -0.89*** -0.87* -0.86** 0.51
(0.21) (0.39) (0.3) (0.23) (0.5) (0.42)
Note: White standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The sample size spans all scheduled FOMC announcements between January 2008
and December 2014. The dependent variables are the 120-minute changes around FOMC announcements.
The LSAP and FG surprises are identified as described in Section 2.1. The Delphic and Odyssean
components are constructed as described in Section 2.2.
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Table 10: Response of Volatility Measures to Decomposed UMPs
Baseline Regressions Decomposed Regressions
FG LSAP R2 DFG OFG DLSAP OLSAP R2
VIX 2.84* -4.02** 0.29 2.11 3.03* -1.65 -4.93** 0.32
(1.55) (1.5) (1.57) (1.63) (3.55) (2.14)
MOVE 6.67*** -4.27 0.2 8.38 6.33** 3.4 -7.22* 0.23
(2.37) (3.29) (5.02) (2.37) (7.85) (4.3)
Note: White standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The sample size spans all scheduled FOMC announcements between January 2008
and December 2014. The dependent variables are the daily changes around FOMC announcements. The
LSAP and FG surprises are identified as described in Section 2.1. The Delphic and Odyssean components
are constructed as described in Section 2.2.
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Table 11: Response of Corporate Yields and Spreads to Decomposed UMPs
Baseline Regressions Decomposed Regressions
FG LSAP R2 DFG OFG DLSAP OLSAP R2
AAA 0.09*** 0.2*** 0.55 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.2*** 0.21*** 0.56
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
BAA 0.09*** 0.23*** 0.61 0.12** 0.09*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.61
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04)
BBB 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.75 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.76
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
AAA-10Y -0.1*** -0.1** 0.5 -0.04 -0.12*** -0.12* -0.09** 0.54
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04)
BAA-10Y -0.1*** -0.08 0.47 -0.05 -0.11*** -0.1 -0.07 0.49
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.08) (0.06)
BBB-10Y -0.05** -0.11*** 0.36 -0.02 -0.06** -0.17*** -0.09*** 0.4
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Note: White standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The sample size spans all scheduled FOMC announcements between January 2008
and December 2014. The dependent variables are the daily changes around FOMC announcements. The
LSAP and FG surprises are identified as described in Section 2.1. The Delphic and Odyssean components
are constructed as described in Section 2.2.
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Table 12: Response of Bluechip Forecasts to Decomposed UMPs and Economic News
Baseline Regressions Decomposed Regressions
FG LSAP R2 DFG OFG DLSAP OLSAP R2
Unemployment
Nowcast -0.25* -0.21 0.16 -0.53** -0.18 -0.4 -0.13 0.2
(0.14) (0.25) (0.21) (0.13) (0.35) (0.27)
Q1 -0.25** -0.16 0.17 -0.5*** -0.18 -0.46 -0.04 0.22
(0.12) (0.24) (0.18) (0.12) (0.33) (0.26)
Q2 -0.22* -0.03 0.2 -0.38** -0.17 -0.32 0.1 0.24
(0.12) (0.23) (0.18) (0.12) (0.32) (0.24)
Q3 -0.2** 0.03 0.27 -0.44*** -0.13 -0.38 0.2 0.33
(0.1) (0.17) (0.17) (0.1) (0.27) (0.2)
Q4 -0.16 0.06 0.25 -0.32* -0.1 -0.36 0.24 0.3
(0.11) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.28) (0.2)
Growth
Nowcast -0.25 -1.43* 0.38 -0.37 -0.22 -1.46 -1.41* 0.39
(0.4) (0.78) (0.7) (0.43) (1.19) (0.84)
Q1 -0.16 -1.06* 0.3 -0.1 -0.19 -0.46 -1.31* 0.31
(0.35) (0.61) (0.6) (0.35) (0.98) (0.66)
Q2 -0.35 -0.21 0.22 -0.39 -0.37 0.47 -0.51 0.28
(0.26) (0.33) (0.46) (0.25) (0.55) (0.37)
Q3 -0.16 -0.1 0.2 -0.23 -0.15 0.08 -0.18 0.21
(0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.16) (0.3) (0.21)
Q4 -0.07 -0.16 0.2 -0.14 -0.07 0 -0.23 0.21
(0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11) (0.24) (0.14)
Inflation
Nowcast -1.09* -0.76 0.35 -1.11 -1.13* 0.34 -1.23 0.37
(0.63) (0.82) (0.84) (0.66) (1.37) (0.93)
Q1 -0.4** -0.41* 0.34 -0.84** -0.33** 0.24 -0.69** 0.42
(0.19) (0.23) (0.33) (0.16) (0.4) (0.28)
Q2 -0.11 0.13 0.22 -0.21 -0.07 -0.06 0.21 0.24
(0.09) (0.12) (0.21) (0.1) (0.24) (0.15)
Q3 0.03 -0.35*** 0.15 0.14 -0.01 -0.21 -0.4*** 0.17
(0.07) (0.12) (0.15) (0.07) (0.26) (0.14)
Q4 -0.05 -0.12** 0.1 -0.18 -0.02 -0.19 -0.1 0.13
(0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.13) (0.06)
Note: White standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The sample size spans all scheduled FOMC announcements between January 2008
and December 2014. The dependent variables are the monthly updates of Bluechip forecasts around FOMC
announcements. The LSAP and FG surprises are identified as described in Section 2.1. The Delphic and
Odyssean components are constructed as described in Section 2.2. The coefficients of economics news are
not reported.
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Figure 10: Empirical FG and LSAP Surprises during the ZLB Period
























Notes: The blue line shows the FG surprise while the red line depicts the LSAP surprise for each scheduled
FOMC announcement during the ZLB period. The empirical identification methodology is as described in
Section 2.1. An FG surprise moves the 2-year interest rate expectations while an LSAP surprise moves the
10-year rate by the percentage point given on the vertical axis.
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Figure 11: Decomposed LSAP Surprises during the ZLB Period





















Notes: The blue line shows the Delphic LSAP surprise while the red line depicts the Odyssean LSAP
surprise for each scheduled FOMC announcement during the ZLB period. The decomposition methodology
is as described in Section 2.2.
84
Figure 12: Decomposed FG Surprises during the ZLB Period
























Notes: The blue line shows the Delphic FG surprise while the red line depicts the Odyssean FG surprise for
each scheduled FOMC announcement during the ZLB period. The decomposition methodology is as
described in Section 2.2.
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Chapter 3
3 Identification of Forward Guidance and QE Surprises
in the UK
3.1 Introduction
Following the global financial crisis, the Bank of England (BoE) has lowered its policy
rate, the Bank rate, to its effective lower bound (ELB) in March 2009.54 While the Bank
rate remained at its ELB for almost a decade, the BoE employed unconventional mone-
tary policies (UMPs) to further stimulate the economy. In particular, the BoE initiated its
quantitative easing (QE) program55 on the same day the Bank rate hit its ELB. While the
communication about the future path of the policy rate, i.e. forward guidance (FG), was an
important monetary policy tool before the global financial crisis, it gained more importance
as the Bank rate was constrained by the ELB.
Following Kuttner (2001), the event-study literature identified the conventional mon-
etary policy surprise as the change in the current month or one-month-ahead Fed funds
futures rate. At the ELB, the variation in this monetary policy surprise is clearly zero.
54Although the Bank rate was lowered to 0.1% in 2020, 0.5% was communicated as the ELB after the
global financial crisis of 2008.
55While the Federal Reserve refers to this UMP as large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs), the BoE calls it
QE policy.
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Gürkaynak et al. (2005) extend this methodology by identifying a second significant mon-
etary policy factor, i.e. the future path of the policy rate, in other words, FG. They further
show that these two factors almost fully explain the movement of the term structure around
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements.56 After the initiation of large-
scale asset purchases (LSAPs) in the US, a new line of research that separates the surprise
effects of different UMPs emerged. Swanson (2020) disentangles the effects of FG and
LSAP surprises, extending the methodology in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) to the ELB period.
Swanson (2020) shows that FG and LSAP surprises almost fully explain the movement of
the term structure around FOMC announcements during the ELB period.
Using high-frequency data, I separately identify FG and QE surprises of the BoE during
the ELB period in the UK, following the methodology of Swanson (2020). Then, I show
the effects of these UMPs on asset prices in the UK and compare these effects with those
in the US. I first document the response of gilt yields and term premia to these UMPs.
Both surprises combined account for only a third of the daily variations in gilt yields and
their term premia on the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) announcement days during
the ELB period. Besides, the impact of UMPs on gilt yeilds and term premia dies out
within a few months. I also measure the responsiveness of stock prices, their volatility and
the British pound to UMPs. While both UMP easings depreciate the pound, FG easings
move stock prices up and their volatility down. QE surprises, on the other hand, do not
56Note that this is also true in the UK.
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significantly move the stock price index and its volatility. Moreover, the impact of FG on
the British pound persists for at least six months. Lastly, I illustrate that corporate bond
spreads and equity risk premia increase in response to larger than expected asset purchases.
Related Literature Over the past decade, a body of research that measures the effec-
tiveness of newly implemented LSAP policies in lowering the yield curve at the ELB has
emerged. While Gagnon et al. (2011), Vissing-Jorgensen and Krishnamurthy (2011) and
D’Amico and King (2013) show that the LSAP policies of the Federal Reserve were ef-
fective in flattening the yield curve, Joyce et al. (2011) come to the same conclusion for
the UK. Given the effectiveness of the QE policies in the UK, there is a subsequent line of
literature that empirically measures the impact of the QE policies employed by the BoE on
macroeconomic variables. Bridges and Thomas (2012), Kapetanios et al. (2012), Baumeis-
ter and Benati (2013) and Churm et al. (2015) use VAR analyses to measure the real impact
of the QE policies and report that the policies were significant in avoiding deflation and
output losses.
There is parallel line of literature that empirically assesses the effects of QE policies in
the UK on asset prices. Rogers et al. (2014) employ identification through heteroskedas-
ticity to show that a QE surprise in the UK lowers government and corporate bond yields
at maturities higher than 2 years. Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) use an empirical dy-
namic term structure model to decompose the yield declines into changes in expectations
about future monetary policy and changes in term premia. They show that the decline is
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due to falling term premia. Using an event-study approach, Joyce et al. (2011) report that
QE1 policy has lowered medium to long rates by about a percentage point and stress the
importance of the portfolio balance channel in the effectiveness of QE1. Goodhart and
Ashworth (2012) argue that the effectiveness of QE1 in loosening financial conditions was
larger than that of QE2 in the UK.
Note that the literature which measures the real and financial effects of UMPs in the
UK does not disentangle a QE surprise from an FG surprise and only Rogers et al. (2014)
employ intraday changes in yields around every MPC announcement. For instance, in an-
other event-study approach, Joyce et al. (2011) employ survey expectations to measure QE
surprises. While the methodology of Swanson (2020) allows one to measure the separate
impact of FG and QE surprises on asset prices, it also produces a time series of UMP
surprises where every MPC announcement is a separate observation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the iden-
tification methodology of FG and QE surprises in the UK. Section 3 presents the analysis
of important MPC announcements in the UK during the ELB period. Section 4 discusses
the responses of asset prices to UMPs. Section 5 documents the persistence of the effects
of FG and QE surprises on asset prices. Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Data and Methodology
The decomposition methodology employed to disentangle the effects of FG and QE on
financial assets is an application of Swanson (2020). This approach provides a way to
separate the relative importance of two distinct UMP tools. The Bank rate surprise, which
is captured by the 30-minute change in the 1-month overnight interest swap rate (OIS1M)
around each MPC meeting, is very small in absolute magnitude during the ELB period and
has no significant impact on financial assets.
I follow the split sample identification in Swanson (2020). In the first step, I focus
on the sample from July 1997 to February 2009, the pre-ELB period where there are two
distinct monetary policy tools: the Bank rate surprise and the future path of the Bank
rate communication, i.e. FG surprise. I extract the first two principal components from a
matrix composed of 30-minute changes in six financial assets whose maturities range from
3 months to 10 years. Specifically, I use the 30-minute changes of the 1st, 2nd and 4th
short sterling futures rates, and the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year gilt yields. The 30-minute
window is between 11:50 and 12:20 on all MPC announcement days between July 1997
and February 2009. The illustration of this extraction can be represented by a factor model:
X = FΛ+ ε (27)
where X is the matrix of the high-frequency changes in financial assets, F is the matrix
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of principal components, Λ is the matrix of loadings and ε is a white noise residual. The
dimensions of X is the number of announcements, T = 140, by the number of financial
assets, n = 6. The dimensions of F is T by k, the number of principal components which
is 2, and the dimensions of Λ is k by n.
As in Gürkaynak et al. (2005), I conduct the rank test of Cragg and Donald (1997) to
identify the number of factors underlying the interest rate responses to the monetary policy
announcements. I employ two principle components following this test. Table 13 shows
that the rank test of Cragg and Donald (1997) rejects the null hypotheses that the rank of
F is 0 (i.e. X is explained by a random walk) or 1 with relatively small p-values. A factor
structure with two dimensions, however, sufficiently explains almost all of the variation in
X matrix.
The first two principal components have no structural interpretation. However, they
explain almost all of the variation in the term structure around MPC announcements. I
rotate these two principal components such that the first vector moves one-to-one with
the surprise change in the 1st short sterling futures rate, and the second vector captures
all the variation orthogonal to the first vector by construction and corresponds to changes
in interest rate expectations over subsequent horizons. Thus, the second factor has the
structural interpretation of a future path of the policy rate, i.e. FG.
The rotation of these first two principal components is done by defining a 2x2 rota-
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tion matrix, U, and plugging it into the factor model given above.57 Defining F̃ = FU and
Λ̃=U ′Λ, the same factor model can be rewritten as in Equation (28). This requires to make
an additional (to the orthogonality assumptions implied by the rotation matrix) identifying
assumption: equating the loading of the second factor that corresponds to the shortest ma-
turity asset, the 1st sterling future, to 0. Therefore, the first column of F̃ has the structural
interpretation of a Bank rate surprise while the second column has the future path of the
policy rate interpretation.
X = F̃Λ̃+ ε (28)
This step follows from Gürkaynak et al. (2005). The second step is proposed by Swan-
son (2020). In this step, a similar exercise is conducted for the ELB period, from March
2009 to August 2018. Since the expectations of the short rates do not move much in the
ELB period, I omit the 1st and 2nd short sterling futures from the asset matrix. Therefore,
X has 4 financial assets whose maturities vary from a year to ten years.
I build the same factor model in Equation (27) for the ELB period. Table 14 shows the
results of the Cragg and Donald (1997) rank test for the ELB period: the number of factors
underlying the high-frequency response of the term structure around MPC announcements
is 2 for this period as well.58 The null hypotheses that the rank of the F̃ matrix is 0 or 1 are
57Since the multiplication of a rotation matrix with its transpose is the identity matrix, the equality still
holds with the same residuals.
58I assume that the rank of F̃ matrix cannot exceed 2 since the Bank rate was effectively zero at the ELB.
92
rejected by the Cragg and Donald (1997) rank test. Thus, I extract the first two principle
components of the X matrix.
The identifying assumption in this step is to minimize the Euclidean distance between
the loadings of the FG factor from the pre-ELB period and the loadings of the FG factor
in the ELB period. This assumption implies that the effect of the FG surprise on the term
structure during the pre-ELB and ELB periods are as close as possible. Though question-
able, Swanson (2020) shows that an alternative (full-sample) identification method implies
a very similar FG factor. This is also true for the UK.
3.3 Analysis of Important Announcements
The resulting factors are presented in Figure 13. A negative surprise is a monetary policy
easing, which corresponds to a longer than expected ELB period (FG easing) or a larger
than expected asset purchase (QE easing). The vertical axis shows the standard deviation
changes in the surprise factors and the horizontal axis shows the MPC announcement dates.
The blue bars in Figure 13 display the FG surprises during the ELB period. March
2009, when the first QE policy was announced and the Bank rate was reduced to its ELB,
is reflected as a large tightening FG surprise. The large tightening on this day could be due
to ex-ante market expectations that the MPC would buy shorter maturity gilts. Moreover,
after the Brexit referendum, the markets expected an additional monetary stimulus in the
July 2016 meeting while the MPC did not announce any further easing (this is reflected as
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a tightening larger than a standard deviation). Other FG tightenings larger than a standard
deviation are the more recent announcements of September 2017, February 2018 and June
2018, in which the Bank communicated that the QE unwinding could start when the Bank
rate hits 1.5% instead of 2%.
As for FG easings, the August 2009 announcement is the largest one. The term structure
shifted downwards drastically as the MPC communicated a “lower path of Bank Rate than
implied by market yields”. Another large FG easing is the July 2013 announcement, when
the MPC started to communicate the timing of the initial Bank rate hike explicitly. The
third largest FG easing is the August 2016 announcement, which is the meeting after the
MPC kept its policy stance following the Brexit referendum. In this meeting, the MPC cut
the Bank rate by 25 basis points, signaling the extension of the ELB, along with further
asset purchases. The November 2017 “Dovish Hike” and May 2018 announcements are
also reflected as recent FG easing surprises larger than a standard deviation.
The pink bars in Figure 13 illustrate the QE surprises. The largest QE surprise, which is
a six standard deviation easing, is the initiation of the QE policy in March 2009. The May
and August 2009 announcements, when QE was expanded, also imply large QE surprises.
The QE2 announcement, which involved an additional 75 billion pound asset purchases in
October 2011, also corresponds to a large QE easing. Another QE easing, which is larger
than 2 standard deviations, is the August 2016 announcement, when the MPC expanded
QE policy after the Brexit referendum. As for QE tightenings, the only surprise larger than
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2 standard deviations is the July 2009 announcement, where the MPC did not expand the
QE as expected.
3.4 The Responses of Asset Prices to UMP Surprises
The effect of FG and QE surprises on asset prices during the ELB period can be estimated
by an event-study approach:
∆Yt = β0 +βFGFGt +βQEQEt + εt (29)
where ∆Yt is the daily change in asset prices (e.g. gilt yields, term premia, stock prices,
the exchange rate).59 Note that I did not impose β0 to be zero but it is expected to be
indistinguishable from zero since there should not be a systematic return for certain assets
on announcement days due to non-monetary policy factors.
3.4.1 Response of Gilt Yields
Table 15 shows the responses of gilt yields whose maturities range from 1 year to 10 years.
Each coefficient estimate shows the basis point change in gilt yields in response to a one
standard deviation tightening surprise. The effect of the FG surprise on gilt yields maturing
from 2 years to 6 years is statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimated effect on
daily gilt yield movements is between 1 to 2 basis points for all yields. As for the QE
59I use log changes for stock prices and the exchange rate.
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surprises, Table 15 shows that the impact of a QE surprise increases towards the long end
of the term structure while it also significantly affects the medium term yields. Its effect
on the 10-year gilt yield is close to 4 basis points. As expected, QE surprises affect longer
term yields more while FG surprises have a larger impact on shorter term yields. FG and
QE surprises, combined, explain only a third of the daily variation in medium to long-term
rates.
The coefficient estimates reported in Table 15 are smaller in absolute magnitude than
their US counterparts.60 The difference in coefficient estimates could be explained by the
relative importance of each monetary policy announcement in both countries. While there
are 8 FOMC announcement in the US every year, there were 12 MPC announcements in
the UK every year until 2018, practically the end of the sample period. Thus, while the
estimated effect of a one standard deviation UMP surprise in the UK is smaller for each
MPC announcement, the cumulative impact of UMP surprises is larger since there are more
announcements in a given year.
The reported coefficients of determination in Table 15 are also much smaller than their
US counterparts. While both UMP surprises explain up to three quarters of the daily vari-
ations of the Treasury yields on the days of FOMC announcements, they explain up to
only a third of the daily variations of gilt yields in the UK. Note that both UMPs explain
60Swanson (2020) reports the 30-minute responses of Treasury yields to UMP surprises and finds larger
coefficient estimates. Note that the daily government yield responses in both countries are slightly larger than
their 30-minute responses since some announcements were followed by detailed press conferences that were
outside the 30-minute intervals around monetary policy announcements. Besides, the financial markets could
have taken some time to process the UMP descriptions and their economic implications.
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almost all of the variation in the government yields in a 30-minute window. Thus, this
stark disparity at a daily horizon could be due to other information revealed throughout the
day. In fact, some important macroeconomic news, such as the quarterly inflation report,61
are announced simultaneously with the monetary policy announcements in the UK. More-
over, unlike the US, one would expect gilt yields of the UK to be more sensitive to foreign
developments revealed throughout the day as a small open economy.
It is important to note that the reported gilt yield responses are the average daily re-
sponses during the ELB period in the UK. There is an alternative line of literature which
reports very large effects of LSAPs on Treasury yields (e.g. Li and Wei (2013), Vissing-
Jorgensen and Krishnamurthy (2011), Gagnon et al. (2011)). The difference is mainly due
to the employed sample period.62 These studies mostly analyze the impact of LSAP sur-
prises in late 2008 and early 2009. Extending the sample space to the whole ELB period
and disentangling the impact of LSAP surprises from FG surprises yield much smaller
effects.63 Greenlaw et al. (2018) argue that the LSAP surprises had large effects on the
Treasury yields at the beginning of the ELB due to severe market dislocation and illiq-
uidity. As the markets improved, the impact of LSAP surprises on Treasury yields went
61The quarterly inflation report is announced simultaneously with the monetary policy announcement since
2015.
62These papers also employ alternative identification methods which do not use high-frequency data. For
instance, Li and Wei (2013) use private holdings of Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securi-
ties to identify LSAP surprises.
63For instance, Greenlaw et al. (2018) report that extending the sample of Gagnon et al. (2011) to all FOMC
announcements and controlling for the impact of FG surprises decrease the estimated impact of LSAPs on
the 10-year yield from 117 basis points to 33 basis points.
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down.64 Therefore, using all monetary policy announcements implies a smaller estimated
impact on government yields.
3.4.2 Response of Term Premia
I also analyze the impact of FG and QE surprises on the term premia components of gilt
yields. Note that term premia are not observed data and different term structure models
employ various assumptions to estimate the term premia. I use the Bank of England’s term
premia estimation for the UK, which is the average of several, relatively imprecise, term
premia estimations implied by different term structure models. Table 16 shows that FG
surprises affect the term premia component of gilt yields with maturities of 1 to 5 years.
Less than half of the estimated impact of FG surprises on gilt yields at all maturities is due
to the impact of FG on the term premia component of gilt yields.65
This result is consistent with economic theory. FG is a communication about the future
path of the policy rates. Hence, it operates mostly through the expectations hypothesis of
the term structure of interest rates. However, changes in expected future short rates could
also affect term premia. For instance, Hanson and Stein (2015) suggest a mechanism due
to investors that increase their demand for longer-term bonds following a cut in short rates.
In this mechanism, the switch to riskier longer-term bonds is motivated by reaching for
64A parallel argument to this is the big shift in market expectations regarding the size of the announced
asset purchases. For instance, QE2 is characterized as an LSAP tightening by Swanson (2020) as the size of
the program did not exceed the market expectations.
65Note that the FG surprises in the US also have a limited impact on term premia.
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higher yields. Hence, the reported coefficient estimates of FG in Table 16 are statistically
significant.
The impact of QE surprises on the term premia component of gilt yields is substantial.
As shown in Table 15, the effect grows with the maturity and almost two thirds of the
impact on the 10-year rates are explained by the change in the term premia component
of gilt yields. The mechanism through which QE surprises lower term premia is often
called the portfolio balance channel. The asset purchases of the central bank reduce the
bond supply in order to lower the term premia. Note that the estimated coefficients of
QE surprises in Table 16 are statistically different than those in Table 15. Thus, it also
moves the government yields through the signalling channel, i.e. the signalling effect of
asset purchases that lowers the expected future short rates. In the US, LSAP surprises also
mostly operate through the portfolio balance channel (see e.g. Gagnon et al. (2011)) while
the signalling channel also exists (see e.g. Bauer and Rudebusch (2014)). Figures 14-15
summarize these findings visually, plotting the daily responses of gilt yields and their term
premia at different maturities to FG and QE surprises with 95% confidence intervals.
3.4.3 Response of Stock Prices and the Exchange Rate
Table 17 shows that both the FTSE All Share (FTSE-AS) index, which captures around
600 companies traded in the London Stock Exchange, and the UK firms in the FTSE-AS
index are responsive to FG surprises. A one standard deviation FG easing moves the stock
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prices up by 35 basis points and the volatility of the stock market down by more than a
percentage point. These results are consistent with economic theory as lower interest rates
would increase expected earnings and decrease the discount rate. Likewise, lower rates are
expected to decrease the stock market volatility due to lower uncertainty and risk aversion
as discussed in Bekaert et al. (2013).
A QE surprise does not significantly influence the stock prices and their volatility. This
could be due to two opposing implications of QE surprises on macroeconomic expectations.
The second chapter of this dissertation shows that, similar to a FG easing, a QE easing
could be interpreted as either “good news” due to looser financial conditions (Odyssean),
or “bad news” due to the central bank’s revealed perception of the state of the economy
(Delphic). Hence, the opposing impact of these two possible interpretations on the stock
prices could be cancelling each other. On the other hand, both UMP easings significantly
depreciate the British pound (ERI). The direction of this relationship is as expected due to
lower international demand for UK financial securities.66
These results are parallel to those in the US. Swanson (2020) shows that a one standard
deviation FG easing increases the S&P500 index by 25 basis points during the ELB period
while the impact of an LSAP surprise is insignificant. He further shows that both UMP
easings depreciate the US dollar with similar magnitudes (a one standard deviation FG
surprise depreciates the dollar by 36 basis points while a one standard deviation LSAP
66Note that both Delphic and Odyssean interpretations of an UMP easing would depreciate the local cur-
rency due to weaker demand for local financial securities.
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surprise depreciates the dollar by 19 basis points). The second chapter of this dissertation
reports that an FG easing in the US during the ELB period decreases the options implied
volatility of the stock market. The volatility decreasing impact of an FG easing is consistent
with the findings of Bekaert et al. (2013), who find that a lax conventional monetary policy
decreases the VIX, the stock market option-based implied volatility.
3.4.4 Response of Corporate Spreads and Equity Risk Premia
I also analyze the impact of UMP surprises on investment grade (IGCORPS) and high yield
(HYCORPS) corporate bond spreads.67 A UMP easing is expected to decrease corporate
bond yields less than government bond yields since central banks operate their asset pur-
chases mostly in government bond markets. Table 18 reports that a QE easing increases the
corporate bond spreads (i.e. lower gilt yields faster than the corporate yields) as one would
expect. Note that LSAP easings in the US also widen the corporate spreads as shown by
Swanson (2020). The last column of Table 18 further shows that a QE easing very signif-
icantly increases the equity risk premia of UK firms, which is estimated by the Bank of
England for the FTSE-AS and FTSE-UK indexes, by almost 4 basis points.
On the other hand, the impact of an FG surprise is not significant on IGCORPS but is
marginally significant with an inverse sign on HYCOPRS. However, the opposite sign of
the FG surprise is not robust to omitting outliers. Using the robust regression (rreg) option
67Note that the average maturity of these corporate bonds is around 8 years and the maturity of the em-
ployed risk-free rate matches the average maturity of the corporate bonds.
101
in Stata68 makes the FG coefficient estimates insignificant as shown in the third and fourth
columns of Table 18.69 Dropping these outliers also makes the coefficients estimates of QE
surprises significant at the 5% significance level in both regressions.
3.5 The Persistence of the Effects on Asset Prices
The persistence of the effect of FG and QE surprises on asset prices can be estimated by
local projections as in Jordà (2005) with Newey and West (1987) standard errors:





where ∆Yt+h is the change in asset prices at different monthly horizons, i.e. Yt+h −Yt−1 for
h ∈ {0,1, ...,6}. FGt and QEt are UMP surprises. ∆Y mt−i, i ∈ {1,2,3,4}, which is the col-
lection of preceding monthly changes of the dependent variable in the four months70 before
the announcement, is the set of control variables. The purpose of this control variable is
to decrease the sampling variance of the estimator by decreasing the variance of the error
term. The coefficient estimates are still consistent in the absence of these control variables
since the UMP surprises, which are identified using high-frequency data, are assumed to
be independent of the true past and future monetary policy shocks.
68The robust regression (rreg) option in Stata computes the Cook’s distance for each observation after
running the OLS regression and drops any observation with a Cook’s distance statistic larger than 1.
69The identified outliers are March 2009 and August 2016 in the HYCORPS regression and March 2009
and May 2009 in the IGCORPS regression. These observations include three of the largest UMP surprises.
70Following Ramey (2016), and Stock and Watson (2018), I include four lags.
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3.5.1 Persistence of the Responses of Gilt Yields and Term Premia
Figures 16-17 illustrate the persistence of the effects of FG and QE surprises on gilt yields
with different maturities ranging from 1-year to 10-years. The impact of FG surprises
on medium term yields (in particular, 1-year and 2-year yields) is significant for about
three months using 95% confidence intervals. Similar to the results presented in Figure
16, Swanson (2020) reports that the impact of FG surprises on the 5-year Treasury yield
persists less than a month at the 5% significance level in the US. On the other hand, Figure
17 shows that the impact of QE surprises on long term yields persists for about two months.
This result is also consistent with the estimated impact of LSAP surprises in the US. Wright
(2012) shows that the impact of UMPs on the long term interest rates in the first half of the
ELB period persists for around two to three months.
Note that the estimated impact of QE surprises on the government yields, as shown for
the UK in this paper and for the US in Wright (2012) and Swanson (2020), is relatively
short lived compared to the studies that report large LSAP effects on the 10-year rates in
the US (e.g. Li and Wei (2013), Vissing-Jorgensen and Krishnamurthy (2011), Gagnon
et al. (2011)). These studies find that the impact on asset prices persists for at least a year.
The difference between these two set of results on the persistence of the effects of LSAPs
is also mainly due to employing a limited sample period as discussed above. Estimating
the persistence of the effects of LSAPs on government yields using all monetary policy
announcements yields much shorter lived effects.
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There is a recent body of research that discusses why the effects of LSAP surprises
on asset prices might be short lived. Duffie (2010) argues that large capital movements
might have a transitory impact on asset prices since capital could be slow-moving and
cannot be reallocated instantly due to limits on capital market intermediation in response
to asset price distortions. Consistent with this argument, Fleckenstein et al. (2014) provide
empirical evidence of TIPS-Treasury mispricing during the global financial crisis while
Greenlaw et al. (2018) and Woodford (2012) discuss how markets reassess their reactions
in response to LSAPs on the subsequent days due to the large-scale of the announced asset
purchases.
In Figures 18-19, I plot the persistence of the effects of FG and QE surprises on the term
premia component of gilt yields with different maturities ranging from 1-year to 10-years.
The persistence of the impact of both UMPs on the term premia component of gilt yields
is roughly the same as the persistence of their impact on gilt yields. While this result is
especially expected for QE surprises which are shown to be mostly operating through the
portfolio balance channel in the UK (see e.g. Joyce et al. (2011)), it is also consistent with
the “reaching for higher yields” argument of Hanson and Stein (2015).
3.5.2 Persistence of the Responses of Stock Prices and the Pound
Next, I analyze the persistence of the impact of FG and QE surprises on stock prices, their
volatility and the British pound. Figure 20 shows that the impact of FG on the FTSE All
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Share index and its volatility dies out within a week, as in the US. This result is consistent
with the “slow-moving capital” argument of Duffie (2010) and the “initial market overre-
action” argument of Greenlaw et al. (2018).
On the other hand, the impact of FG on the British pound persists for at least six months
at the 5% significance level and the size of its impact grows in absolute magnitude, up to
a percentage point. Therefore, markets undervalue the induced depreciation in the British
pound on the day of the MPC announcement and the pound continues to depreciate in re-
sponse to the commitment of staying at the ELB for longer than expected. On the contrary,
the impact of an FG surprise on the dollar is very transitory in the US.
Both the growing impact of FG on the British pound and the transitory impact of FG on
the US dollar could be due to the time taken by markets to digest important news. Note that
this readjustment could be in either direction. Hence, while an FG easing in the US tem-
porarily depreciates the USD, an FG easing in the UK has a much more permanent impact
on the pound. The relative overreaction of the US dollar on the day of the announcement
could be explained by the relatively larger volume of transactions made in the US dollar.
The effect of QE surprises on the FTSE is insignificant at nearly all horizons. A QE eas-
ing is estimated with 95% confidence to increase the stock market index after five months.
Interestingly, the impact of an LSAP surprise on stock prices in the US is also insignifi-
cant at nearly all horizons, except for a transitory impact with an expected sign after three
months. These lagged responses could be explained by the gradual decrease in the uncer-
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tainty associated with the macroeconomic implications of the undertaken QE policy. The
implied decrease in uncertainty could lower risk premia and the expected earnings in the
financial sector could be increasing with a lag. Hence, a QE easing would be increasing
stock prices with a lag of few months.71 The response of stock market volatility over longer
horizons is also consistent with this argument. A QE easing temporarily lowers stock mar-
ket volatility after five months (while other policy surprises do instantaneously) due to the
time it takes to process the macroeconomic implications of a QE surprise.
As in the US, the currency depreciating effect of a QE easing is very transitory. This
finding is consistent with the arguments of limits on capital market intermediation and
initial market overreaction as discussed above. Note that the sign of its impact on the do-
mestic currency flips temporarily after five months. This flipped sign is also consistent
with the transitory increase in stock prices after five months. If market participants ob-
served stronger economic activity in response to QE policies, we would expect to see a
lagged appreciation in the domestic currency due to higher demand for domestic financial
securities.
71Note that this significant lagged impact is also transitory as the instantaneous effect of an FG surprise.
Hence, the lagged transitory impact could also be a mispricing due to the limits on capital market intermedi-
ation as discussed by Duffie (2010).
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3.6 Conclusion
Using high-frequency data, I empirically identify FG and QE surprises employed by the
BoE when its policy rate was constrained by the ELB. Then, I show that both policies were
effective in moving asset prices in the UK around MPC announcements. However, the
UMP surprises account for up to only a third of the daily variations in gilt yields and term
premia during the ELB period. Moreover, as in the US, their impact on gilt yields and term
premia do not persist for more than a few months.
I further document that both FG and QE surprises significantly influence the British
pound. The impact of FG persists for at least six months while the effect of QE disappears
very quickly. FG surprises are also effective in moving stock prices and their volatility.
However, the response of stock prices to FG surprises does not persist more than a week. I
further find that corporate bond spreads and equity risk premia increase in response to QE
easings.
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Table 13: Testing the Number of Factors that Explain the Interest Rate Movements Around
MPC Announcements in the Pre-ELB Period
No. of Factors Degrees of Wald
under the Null Freedom Statistic p-value
0 15 72.48 1×10−6
1 9 22.62 0.07
2 4 2.49 0.65
The conducted test follows the Cragg and Donald (1997) test for the number of factors underlying the T ×n
matrix X of the 30-minute responses of the term structure in the UK to the MPC announcements from July
1997 to February 2009. T = 140 and n = 6. The test is for H0 : k = k0 versus HA : k > k0. Section 2 explains
the methodology in detail.
Table 14: Testing the Number of Factors that Explain the Interest Rate Movements Around
MPC Announcements in the ELB Period
No. of Factors Degrees of Wald
under the Null Freedom Statistic p-value
0 10 26.65 3×10−3
1 5 9.02 0.10
The conducted test follows the Cragg and Donald (1997) test for the number of factors underlying the T ×n
matrix X of the 30-minute responses of the term structure in the UK to the MPC announcements from
March 2009 to June 2018. T = 105 and n = 4. The test is for H0 : k = k0 versus HA : k > k0. Section 2
explains the methodology in detail.
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Table 15: Response of Gilt Yields to FG and QE Surprises
1YR 2YR 3YR 4YR 5YR 6YR 7YR 8YR 9YR 10YR
FG 0.69 1.28*** 1.64*** 1.70*** 1.59*** 1.40*** 1.21** 1.04* 0.91 0.81
(0.44) (0.42) (0.37) (0.38) (0.42) (0.47) (0.52) (0.55) (0.57) (0.59)
QE 0.57** 1.15** 1.81*** 2.42*** 2.92*** 3.28*** 3.52*** 3.68*** 3.76*** 3.82***
(0.26) (0.40) (0.48) (0.57) (0.68) (0.78) (0.86) (0.92) (0.96) (0.98)
R2 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
N 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
Note: White standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The estimated coefficients are the basis point changes in the yields in response to a
standard deviation UMP surprise. The regressions are run as in Equation (29). The sample period spans the
ELB period, from March 2009 to June 2018.
Table 16: Response of the Term Premia to FG and QE Surprises
1YTP 2YTP 3YTP 4YTP 5YTP 6YTP 7YTP 8YTP 9YTP 10YTP
FG 0.26** 0.50*** 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.39* 0.23 0.06 -0.11 -0.26 -0.39
(0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.19) (0.22) (0.26) (0.30) (0.35) (0.39) (0.44)
QE -0.33 0.13 0.58*** 0.96*** 1.28*** 1.56*** 1.80*** 2.00*** 2.16*** 2.29***
(0.21) (0.16) (0.21) (0.29) (0.37) (0.45) (0.52) (0.59) (0.65) (0.70)
R2 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29
N 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
Note: White standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The estimated coefficients are the basis point changes in the yields in response to a
standard deviation UMP surprise. The regressions are run as in Equation (29). The sample period spans the
ELB period, from March 2009 to June 2018.
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Table 17: Responses of Stock Prices and the British Pound to FG and QE
FTSE-AS FTSE-UK VFTSE ERI
FG -0.35*** -0.34*** 1.66** 0.27***
(0.11) (0.08) (0.83) (0.07)
QE 0.09 0.09 -1.02 0.17***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.79) (0.04)
R2 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.31
N 105 105 105 105
Note: White standard errors, are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The estimated coefficients are the percentage point changes in the asset prices to a
standard deviation UMP surprise. The regressions are run as in Equation (29). The sample period spans the
ELB period, from March 2009 to June 2018. FTSE-AS is the average stock price of all firms in the FTSE,
FTSE-UK is the average stock price of all UK firms in the FTSE, VFTSE is the volatility index of the FTSE
and ERI is the response of the British Pound index.
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Table 18: Responses of Corporate Spreads and Equity Risk Premia to FG and QE
IGCORPS HYCORPS IGCORPS HYCORPS ERP-AS ERP-UK
FG 0.24 0.61* -0.86 -0.10 0.66 0.83
(0.12) (0.35) (0.63) (0.17) (1.16) (0.61)
QE -2.20 -0.94* -1.58** -0.39** -2.25 -3.90***
(1.83) (0.48) (0.79) (0.20) (1.49) (0.95)
R2 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.12
N 105 105 103 103 105 105
Note: White standard errors, are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively. The estimated coefficients are the basis point changes in the yields to a standard
deviation UMP surprise. The regressions are run as in Equation (29). The sample period spans the ELB
period, from March 2009 to June 2018. The robust regressions in the 3rd and 4th columns omit the outlier
observations with Cook’s distance statistic larger than 1. IGCORPS is the corporate spread of investment
grade firms, HYCORPS is the corporate spread of high yield firms, ERP-AS is the equity risk premium of
the FTSE-AS index and ERP-UK is the equity risk premium of the FTSE-UK index.
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Figure 13: FG and QE Surprises in the UK
Notes: The blue bars show the FG surprise while the pink line depicts the QE surprise for each MPC
announcement during the ELB period. The empirical identification methodology is as described in Section
2. Positive surprises are tightenings while negative surprises are easings. Units are in standard deviations.
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Figure 14: Responses of Gilt Yields and Term Premia to FG Surprises



















Notes: The blue solid line shows the estimated impact of FG surprises on gilt yields at different maturities
while the red solid line shows the estimated impact of FG surprises on the term premia as reported in Tables
3 and 4. The dashed lines are 95% confidence bands, constructed using White standard errors.
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Figure 15: Responses of Gilt Yields and Term Premia to QE Surprises


















Notes: The blue solid line shows the estimated impact of QE surprises on gilt yields at different maturities
while the red solid line shows the estimated impact of QE surprises on the term premia as reported in Tables
3 and 4. The dashed lines are 95% confidence bands, constructed using White standard errors.
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Figure 16: Persistence of the Effect of FG on Gilt Yields
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Notes: The blue solid line shows the estimated impact of an FG surprise on gilt yields with different
maturities at different monthly horizons. The dashed lines are 95% confidence bands, constructed using
Newey-West standard errors. The local projections are conducted as described in Section 5.
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Figure 17: Persistence of the Effect of QE on Gilt Yields
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Notes: The blue solid line shows the estimated impact of a QE surprise on gilt yields with different
maturities at different monthly horizons. The dashed lines are 95% confidence bands, constructed using
Newey-West standard errors. The local projections are conducted as described in Section 5.
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Figure 18: Persistence of the Effect of FG on the Term Premia
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Notes: The blue solid line shows the estimated impact of an FG surprise on the term premia at different
monthly horizons. The dashed lines are 95% confidence bands, constructed using Newey-West standard
errors. The local projections are conducted as described in Section 5.
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Figure 19: Persistence of the Effect of QE on the Term Premia
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Notes: The blue solid line shows the estimated impact of a QE surprise on the term premia at different
monthly horizons. The dashed lines are 95% confidence bands, constructed using Newey-West standard
errors. The local projections are conducted as described in Section 5.
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Figure 20: The Effect of FG and QE on Stock Prices, Market Volatility and the Pound
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Notes: The blue solid line shows the estimated impact of FG and QE on stock prices, their volatility and the
British Pound index (ERI) at different maturities. The dashed lines are 95% confidence bands, constructed
using Newey-West standard errors. The local projections are conducted as described in Section 5.
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A Appendix A: Standard Sticky Price Model
This section describes the baseline model presented in Section 3.1. The model builds on a
standard sticky price model as in Gali (2008). There is staggered price setting as in Calvo
(1983). The source of uncertainty in the employed model is the FG shock which changes
the path of the nominal interest rate.
A.1 Households
An infinitely-lived representative household, who has access to a complete set of contin-
gent claims, maximizes his/her expected lifetime utility subject to a standard intertemporal


















Pt(i)Ct(i)di+QtBt ≤ Bt−1 +WtNt and lim
T→∞
Et [BT ]≥ 0 ∀t (A2)
where Pt(i) is the price of good i and Ct(i) is the consumption of good i. Bt is the amount
of one-period bonds purchased at the price of Qt . Wt is the aggregate wage. σ denotes the
CRRA and the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ϕ is the inverse elasticity
of labor supply to wages. The variable Nt is the labor supply decision and Ct is the con-
sumption decision. Ct can be expressed as a CES composite consumption index while Nt is
120















where ε is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution among goods.
The intertemporal choice of households implies the standard Euler equation. Therefore,
the log-linearized deviation of consumption from its steady state is:
ct = Et [ct+1]−
1
σ
(it −Et [πt+1]) (A5)
where πt is inflation, it ≡−logQt is the deviation of the nominal interest rate from its steady
state. The intratemporal choice of the household yields the standard optimality condition:
wt − pt = σct +ϕnt (A6)
where all lower case variables are log-linearized deviations from their steady states.
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A.2 Firms
All firms have a Cobb-Douglas production function: Yt(i) = ANt(i). The production is
assumed to be constant returns to scale. The technology is assumed to be constant. The










The log-linearized deviations of total production and labor supply from their steady states
are the same:
yt = nt (A8)
Following Calvo (1983), (1−θp) fraction of the firms cannot update their prices each
period. Since firms know that only θp fraction of the firms can update their prices each











(β (1−θp))kEt [mct+k + pt ] (A9)
The optimal price setting yields the standard relation between inflation and real marginal
cost of production.
πt = β Et [πt+1]+λmct (A10)
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where λ ≡ θp(1−θp)(1− (1−θp)β ).
A.3 Equilibrium
With the goods market clearing condition and the consumption Euler equation, the standard
dynamic IS curve (2) is obtained. Plugging the deviation of real marginal cost from its
steady state in equation (A10) yields the standard NK Phillips curve (3).
B Appendix B: Adding Rigidities in the Labor Market
This is an extension to the sticky price and the sticky information models employed in this
paper. First, I show that introducing wage stickiness improves the fit of the baseline sticky
price model. Despite this result, I further show that the results presented in the paper are
robust to introducing nominal rigidities in the labor market: a sticky price model, with or
without bounded rationality (BR), cannot match the empirical impulse responses while a
sticky price model with Delphic interpretation or a sticky information model can.
B.1 Sticky Price Model with Sticky Wages
The introduced nominal rigidities are as in Erceg et al. (2000). Adding monopoly power to
workers in the labor market requires to redefine the labor supply index, given in Equation












Besides, workers with monopoly power can choose an optimal level of wage. In the
sticky price model, only θw fraction of them can update their wages. Consequently, one




t = β Et [πwt+1]+κw (σ +ϕ)yt −κw(wt − pt) (B2)
where κw ≡ θw(1−θw)(1+ϕγ)(1− (1−θw)β ) and wt is the deviation of the nominal wage from
its steady state. Under constant returns to scale, the extended CPI inflation NKPC is derived
as a function of the deviation of the real wage from its steady state.
π
p
t = β Et [π
p
t+1]+κ(wt − pt) (B3)
The dynamic IS curve is not affected by the introduction of nominal rigidities in the
labor market. Equations (2), (4), (B2) and (B3) with relevant initial conditions define the
equilibrium of the sticky price model with sticky wages.
Introducing BR implies the following Phillips curves while the dynamic IS curve is as
72This parameter is calibrated to 6, implying a steady state wage markup of 20%.
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given in Equation (6).
π
w
t = β µ
f
wEt [πwt+1]+κw (σ +ϕ)yt −κw(wt − pt) (B4)
where µ fw ≡ µ
(









t+1]+κ(wt − pt) (B5)







Introducing Delphic interpretation does not change the wage and CPI inflation Phillips
curves (B2)-(B3). The dynamic IS curve is as given in Equation (10).
B.2 Sticky Information Model with Labor Market Rigidities
Adding imperfections (information stickiness and monopolistic power for workers) in the
labor market requires to discern a unit of household into a consumer and a worker who
update their information sets at different paces in a sticky information model. θw param-
eter denotes the fraction of workers who update their information set each period. As in
Reis (2009), workers solve a labor supply optimization problem while consumers solve a
consumption optimization problem subject to the same budget constraint.
Given the information stickiness and the monopolistic power of workers in the labor
market, the nominal wage curve can be derived as in Reis (2009). The term in expectations
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where y∞ = limτ→∞Et(yt+τ) is the long-run equilibrium output and Rt = Et ∑∞τ=0(it+τ −
(pt+1+τ − pt+τ)) is the long real interest rate. Since the optimal price is the sum of the
given price level and the real marginal costs with the addition of imperfections in the labor
market, the optimal price is only a function of nominal wages under constant returns to





(1−θp)iEt−i [wt ] (B7)
Equations (4), (17), (B6) and (B7) with relevant initial conditions define the sticky infor-
mation equilibrium with imperfections in the labor market.
B.3 Matching Empirical Moments
When workers have monopolistic power in the labor market (hence, they can charge a
markup in their wages) and the wages in the labor market are updated infrequently as in
Calvo (1983), the overall responsiveness of macroeconomic and financial variables to an
FG shock decrease drastically in a sticky price model under rational expectations (RE). Al-
though there are few papers that employ a medium-scale NK model with wage stickiness in
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the FG puzzle literature (e.g. Del Negro et al. (2015)), the partial effect of wage stickiness
in addressing the FG puzzle is not highlighted in the literature.
Figure B1 shows that the model-implied response of the CPI price level fits the data
well while output and working hours jump implausibly at time 0 under the baseline sticky
price model. The model-implied response of output gets empirically plausible more than a
year after the FG shock is introduced. The initial jump in the working hours is implausibly
large due to the excessive jump in output. Table B1 reports that the quadratic distance
between the model-implied and empirical impulse responses, which has a χ2 distribution,
is 584 after introducing wage rigidities in the baseline sticky price model. There is still a
puzzle, however the puzzle is much smaller than the one that emerges in the absence of
sticky wages.
There are two reasons for the CPI level to be less responsive to the same FG shock in
the presence of a wage markup and wage stickiness in the sticky price model. First, the CPI
inflation is less responsive to output gap since the real marginal cost is less responsive to
production (with the presence of a markup in real wages, it is relatively less responsive to
the level of production). This channel outweighs the additional responsiveness of the CPI
inflation created by the deviation of the real wage from its steady state in the presence of
nominal rigidities in the labor market. As the CPI level deviates less from its steady state,
inflation expectations are stickier and the real interest rate moves less in response to an FG
shock. Given this muted path of the real interest rate, output responds less as well.
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A natural question to ask after showing the better fit of a sticky price model with sticky
wages is whether adding BR to a sticky price model with sticky wages can match the em-
pirical impulse responses with an empirically plausible cognitive discount factor, µ . Table
B1 shows that the cognitive discount factor that minimizes the quadratic distance between
the model-implied and the empirical impulse responses is 0.23. Although introducing a
sticky wage framework suffices to fit the price level, the implausible jump of output can
only be muted by choosing an implausibly small cognitive discount factor, similar to the
one required in the absence of sticky wages.
On the other hand, introducing Delphic interpretation or employing a sticky information
model still addresses the puzzle in the presence of nominal rigidities in the labor market.
Table B1 shows that the probability of Delphic interpretation, ψ , that best matches the data
is 0.43. Likewise, when 3% of consumers update their information sets (δ = 0.03), the
sticky information model is able to match the data well. Although Reis (2009) estimates
3% as the lower bound of a plausible range for δ in the US, a benchmark calibration of 8%
implies impulse responses that are not statistically different from their empirical counter-
parts at the 5% significance level.
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Table B1: Estimations under Sticky Prices and Wages
Est. Param. χ2 p-value
Sticky Prices and Wages − 584 0
Sticky Prices and Wages with BR (µ) 0.23 24 0.55
(0.02)
Sticky Prices and Wages with Delphic Interp. (ψ) 0.43 31 0.22
(0.004)
Calibrated Sticky Information and Wages (δ ) 0.08 29 0.33
−
Estimated Sticky Information and Wages (δ ) 0.03 16 0.93
(0.004)
Note: Note that θw is calibrated to 0.25 in both the sticky price and the sticky information models.
χ2 test statistics are the values of the objective function in (19).
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Figure B1: Baseline Sticky Price Model with Sticky Wages (Inverse Wage Stickiness =
0.25)











































































































Notes: The model-implied impulse responses are under baseline calibration where the average duration of
both prices and wages is one year, i.e. θp = θw = 0.25. The model-implied impulse responses do not have a
CI since the model is fully calibrated. 68% CIs of the empirical impulse responses are constructed using
Newey-West standard errors with a maximum lag of 1.5×horizon. The introduced shock is an estimated FG
shock as the black line in Figure 1 of the paper.
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